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THE PAST, PRESENCE, AND FUTURE OF 
LEGAL WRITING SCHOLARSHIP: RHETORIC, 
VOICE, AND COMMUNITY 
Linda L. Berger, Linda H. Edwards, and Terrill Pollman  
This Article welcomes a new generation of legal writing scho-
lars.  
In the first generation, legal writing professors debated 
whether they should be engaged in legal scholarship at all.1  In 
the second generation, assuming that they should be engaged in 
scholarship, legal writing professors discerned and defined differ-
ent genres of and topics for the scholarship in which some or all of 
us were or should be engaged.2  In this Article, we map the con-
tours of a third generation of legal writing scholarship—one that 
integrates the elements of our professional lives and engages 
more effectively with our professional communities.  
The core of such study and practice is rhetoric,3 and in par-
ticular, the rhetorical concept that meaning is constructed out of 
  
  © 2010, Linda L. Berger, Linda H. Edwards, and Terrill Pollman.  All rights re-
served.  Linda L. Berger is Professor of Law at Mercer University School of Law; Linda H. 
Edwards is Professor of Law at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas School of Law; Terrill 
Pollman is Ralph Denton Professor of Law at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas School 
of Law.  The Authors thank the organizers, sponsors, and hosts of the 25th Anniversary 
Symposium of the Legal Writing Institute; the editors of Legal Writing: The Journal of the 
Legal Writing Institute; Yonna Shaw, Brittany Flowe, and the student editors and mem-
bers of the Mercer Law Review; and Mercer University School of Law. 
 1. Vestiges of this debate still flavor discussions among legal writing professors; 
objections to emphasizing traditional forms of scholarship center on the heavy commenting 
and teaching workload of skills professors as well as the perceived divide between theory 
and practice.  For discussions of the conditions of this debate, see for example, Christian C. 
Day, In Search of the Read Footnote: Techniques for Writing Legal Scholarship and Having 
It Published, 6 Leg. Writing 229 (2000); Toni M. Fine, Legal Writers Writing: Scholarship 
and the Demarginalization of Legal Writing Instructors, 5 Leg. Writing 225 (1999); Susan 
P. Liemer, The Quest for Scholarship, The Legal Writing Professor’s Paradox, 80 Or. L. 
Rev. 1007 (2001). 
 2. Mitchell Nathanson, Taking the Road Less Traveled: Why Practical Scholarship 
Makes Sense for the Legal Writing Professor, 11 Leg. Writing 329 (2005); Terrill Pollman & 
Linda H. Edwards, Scholarship by Legal Writing Professors: New Voices in the Legal Acad-
emy, 11 Leg. Writing 3, 15 (2005); Michael R. Smith, The Next Frontier: Exploring the 
Substance of Legal Writing, 2 J. ALWD 1 (2004). 
 3. For the authors of the classical rhetoric text, ―rhetoric is the art or the discipline 
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the interaction of reader and writer, text and context.4  As a re-
sult, our work as readers and writers matters.  The study and 
practice of ―law as rhetoric‖ is a thread that can run through the 
fabric of a professional life, weaving together the legal writing 
professor‘s work in scholarship,5 teaching, and professional ser-
vice.  
Part I of the Article takes a look back at our developing dis-
cipline.6 Part II addresses the rhetorical communities we are con-
structing through our scholarship, as well as some ways we might 
think about re-imagining them.7  Part III sketches a possible map 
for our future, discussing the reasons why legal writing professors 
should be writing and suggesting that rhetoric provides topics, 
theories, and practices for teaching and scholarship that can 
guide academics, lawyers, and law students as they interpret, 
imagine, and compose legal arguments.  
By arguing that rhetoric provides resources for the third gen-
eration of legal writing scholarship, we set out on a natural path 
for those who teach students how to construct rhetorically effec-
tive texts.  But we recognize that there are risks to suggesting 
  
that deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or persuade or 
motivate an audience.‖  Edward P.J. Corbett & Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for 
the Modern Student 1 (4th ed., Oxford U. Press 1999).  For Steven Mailloux, ―Rhetoric 
deals with effects of texts, persuasive and tropological.  By ‗texts,‘ I mean objects of inter-
pretive attention, whether speech, writing, nonlinguistic practices, or human artifacts of 
any kind.‖  Steven Mailloux, Disciplinary Identities: Rhetorical Paths of English, Speech, 
and Composition 40 (Modern Lang. Assn. of Am. 2006).  Aristotle‘s often-quoted definition 
of the practical art of rhetoric was ―the faculty wherein one discovers the available means 
of persuasion in any case whatsoever.‖  Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle 224, bk. I, ch. I 
1355b, line 26 (Lane Cooper trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1932). 
 4. See e.g. Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse:  The Ebb and 
Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. Leg. Educ. 155, 155–157 (1999). 
 5. Maksymilian Del Mar has noted that the five responsibilities of scholarship (read-
ing, writing, teaching, collegiality, and engagement) can ―provide a framework for imagin-
ing the institutional life of a legal scholar.‖  Maksymilian Del Mar, Living Legal Scholar-
ship, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1051001 (Aug. 1, 2007). 
 6. This section attempts to emulate Steven Mailloux‘s advice that we should be ―us-
ing rhetoric to practice theory by doing history.‖  Mailloux, supra n. 3, at 40.  
  For a more extensive early history of legal writing scholarship and predictions 
about the future, see Jill J. Ramsfield & J. Christopher Rideout, Scholarship in Legal 
Writing, in The Politics of Legal Writing: Proceedings of a Conference for Legal Research 
and Writing Program Directors 74 (July 28–29, 1995) (available at http://www.alwd.org 
/publications/pdf/LRW_PoliticsofLegalWriting.pdf), and James F. Stratman, The Emer-
gence of Legal Composition as a Field of Inquiry: Evaluating the Prospects, 60 Rev. Educ. 
Research 153, 210 (1990). 
 7. The concept of the rhetorical community emerges from the work of James Boyd 
White, especially James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cul-
tural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 695 (1985). 
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that we should apply rhetorical theories and approaches to our 
scholarship, and especially to our study of the ―effects of texts.‖  
Focusing on legal rhetoric may nurture scholarship so diverse and 
fragmented that we cannot claim that it constitutes part of a dis-
crete discipline.  Turning to other disciplines may subject our 
scholarship to criticism that it is both too theoretical and not tho-
roughly enough grounded in the theory we apply.  Engaging in 
provocative conversations about our ideas will require us to be 
critical at times of one another‘s work, something that may seem 
damaging to our discipline‘s need for community-building and 
community support.  Meeting the expectations of ―inside‖ and 
―outside‖ communities will test our political astuteness as well as 
the strength of our emerging field.  All these risks accompany the 
maturing of a discipline, and so we hope that the conversation 
about them will continue. 
I.  A RHETORICAL HISTORY OF LEGAL WRITING 
SCHOLARSHIP 
The path of legal writing scholarship has been marked by 
twists and turns, the occasional rockslide or dead end, and what 
we can now see as a series of steps in a purposeful direction.  As 
Pierre Schlag points out, legal scholarship is an ―institutionalized 
social practice.‖8  Enforcing the canons of this, like any other so-
cial practice, ―is invariably a sort of policing action, no matter how 
benign its motivations, and police often step up their vigilance 
when they fear that social order is breaking down.‖9  
When legal writing professors took a turn towards scholar-
ship, the prevailing view in the legal academy was that scholar-
ship examining theory and doctrine was to be preferred over pe-
dagogical scholarship or scholarship examining skills and prac-
tice.10  At the same time, within academia more generally, the 
  
 8. Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing 
Happening (a Report on the State of the Art), 97 Geo. L.J. 803, 805 (2009). 
 9. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. 
L. Rev. 963, 980–981 (1998). 
 10. What we think of as typical or traditional legal scholarship has changed a great 
deal during its short history.  In the 1950s, law schools began to move from relying on 
part-time teachers who were also practicing lawyers or judges to hiring full-time profes-
sors who created a ―community of scholars.‖  Richard Buckingham et al., Law School 
Rankings, Faculty Scholarship, and Associate Deans for Faculty Research 5 (Suffolk U. L. 
Sch. Research Paper, Working Paper No. 07-23, 2007), available at http:// 
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interpretation of ―texts‖ was favored over the composition of 
texts.11  In both cases, the more respected professors were those 
whose scholarship focused not on how to write or how to teach, 
but instead on how to interpret, analyze, and critique the written 
artifacts of legal processes.  The status, expectations, and work-
loads of legal writing teachers constituted what could have been 
an insurmountable roadblock to scholarship; legal writing teach-
ers were not expected to publish, and the numbers of students 
they were assigned, as well as the teaching and commenting prac-
tices they engaged in, made it difficult to find the time to study 
and write. 
The twists and turns toward interdisciplinary legal scholar-
ship opened up a new direction for legal writing scholars.12  Since 
the late 1960s, articles featuring interdisciplinary applications to 
the law have proliferated, from law and economics to law and lit-
  
ssrn.com/abstract=965032. Some have traced the intense focus on faculty scholarship in 
law schools ―back to 1959 when the AALS adopted an official research standard.  The 
standard noted that faculty members had an important responsibility to advance and 
share ‗ordered knowledge‘ [and that] AALS member law schools had an obligation to assist 
their faculty and encourage research and scholarship.‖  Id. at 5–6. 
  Much of the subsequent legal scholarship was doctrinal and descriptive, or theoret-
ical and prescriptive; the purpose of most scholarship was to prescribe a better outcome to 
a judge.  As Judge Posner put it, the task of ―doctrinal‖ legal scholarship was simply to 
―extract a doctrine from the line of cases or from statutory text and history, restate it, 
perhaps criticize it or seek to extend it, all the while striving for ‗sensible‘ results in light of 
legal principles and common sense.‖  See Richard Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 
Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1316 (2002).  The prescriptions were predominantly based on policy 
arguments derived from beliefs about the way society should be organized or operated.  
  Typical of the criticisms of this kind of legal scholarship were Judge Edwards‘s 
comments that law faculties had abandoned scholarship directed to judges, practicing 
lawyers, and legislators in favor of producing scholarship that primarily engages in theo-
retical dialogues with academics in other fields.  Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunc-
tion between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 34–36 (1992). 
 11. In the early twentieth century, the study of oral rhetoric split off from the study of 
written rhetoric in American universities.  
At the same time, literary scholarship came to dominate English departments at the 
expense of pedagogy and composition study, which were often conceived as more rhe-
torically oriented than either historical research or critical interpretations of litera-
ture.  By the middle of the twentieth century, rhetoric as the study of the language 
arts found itself radically fragmented into separate disciplinary domains with facul-
ties that did not and, for the most part, still do not talk with each other.  With min-
imum modification, this unfortunate sorting continues: speech criticism into com-
munication departments, literary reading into English departments, and writing re-
search into composition programs. 
Mailloux, supra n. 3, at 32.  
 12. Although doctrinal scholarship has declined in number and placement, it probably 
still constitutes the bulk of legal scholarship.  Douglas M. Coulson, Legal Writing and 
Disciplinary Knowledge-Building:  A Comparative Study, 6 J. ALWD 160, 166–167 (2009). 
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erature to law and cognitive science.13  Some of these disciplines 
lend themselves to arguments that come naturally to legal writ-
ing professors, arguments about what language means or what 
decision-makers intended or how a decision was reached and how 
it should be interpreted.  Still, as legal writing scholars draw on 
other disciplines, another obstacle may appear.  As has been 
noted elsewhere, the scholarly traditions of other disciplines 
sometimes differ from the traditions of scholarly writing in law 
reviews.14  Those differences may be perceived in ways that are 
damaging when legal writing scholars are evaluated.15  
A.   Putting the First Foot on the Path: Descriptions of Programs 
and Curricula 
Early in the twentieth century, critics discovered that law-
yers did not write clearly, and legal writing programs were estab-
lished in law schools.  The ensuing legal writing scholarship de-
scribed the programs and curricula that had been developed by 
individual law schools.  Most of that scholarship was published in 
a single journal, the Journal of Legal Education.16 
These trends can be seen in an early chronological bibliogra-
phy of ―teaching lawyers to write‖;17 the bibliography began with 
a 1921 article published in the ABA Journal that focused on De-
fects in the Written Style of Lawyers.18  Next, Harry Kalven de-
  
 13. Id. at 166–168. 
 14. Douglas Coulson compared law review articles with writing in the humanities:  
In both the text-level patterns of variation and the sentence subjects, the [law re-
view] articles in the sample reflect a sustained discourse among jurists who seek to 
build on, refine, and dispute each others‘ conclusions regarding the application of 
well-developed concepts to a newly emerging legal question.  The writers‘ concern 
with rigorous definition and classification of legal phenomena appears to reflect the 
influence of legal formalism, which views law as a science seeking to develop an or-
dered ―system of norms conceived as a grammar of legal validity‖ to inform prescrip-
tive analysis.  The articles exhibit virtually none of the forms of literary argument 
identified in studies of literary criticism, but instead reflect a concerted effort to 
―master complexity,‖ ―simplify intelligently,‖ and ―provoke closure,‖ rather than to 
explore the complexity of phenomena, data, or texts for their own sake.  
Id. at 194. 
 15. See pt. II. 
 16. This conclusion is supported by the bibliography compiled in James R. Elkins, 
Teaching Lawyers to Write: A Chronological Bibliography, 22 Leg. Stud. Forum 778 (1998). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Urban A. Lavery, The Language of the Law: Defects in the Written Style of Law-
yers, Some Illustrations, the Reasons Therefor, and Certain Suggestions as to Improvement, 
7 ABA J. 277 (1921). 
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scribed the University of Chicago Law School‘s ―training‖ program 
in Research and Exposition in the Journal of Legal Education.19  
This article was followed by a series of descriptions of legal writ-
ing programs, including several that addressed what appeared to 
be the most significant issue for law school administrators, the 
cost of such programs.  So it was only to be expected that A Low-
Cost Legal Writing Program: The Wisconsin Experience,20 pub-
lished in 1959, was followed in 1973 by Legal Writing and Moot 
Court at Almost No Cost: The Kentucky Experience.21 
In the midst of this flow of descriptive and instrumental scho-
larship, there were some early signs of more evaluative and theo-
retical scholarship about the teaching of writing.  Marjorie Rom-
bauer published a comparison of First-Year Legal Research and 
Writing Programs: Then and Now in 1973,22 and Reed Dickerson 
suggested that writing might even be viewed as helpful to think-
ing.23  And legal writing scholarship would soon find the voice to 
express what they had learned about teaching from their research 
and their experiences. 
B.   Leap One: Finding a Voice 
Descriptions of legal writing curricula and programs were ne-
cessary for the field to discover itself and begin to define its boun-
daries.  But legal writing teachers took a status-changing leap 
when they began to write interdisciplinary articles about how to 
teach writing.  Recognizing that people who taught undergra-
duates to write might know something useful about teaching law-
yers to write, a few law schools had hired professors with degrees 
in English composition or literature.  The subsequent interdiscip-
linary richness of the early legal writing scholarship owes much 
to those teachers who entered the field with advanced degrees in 
English composition and literature and became devoted to legal 
  
 19. Harry Kalven, Jr., Law School Training in Research and Exposition:  The Univer-
sity of Chicago Program, 1 J. Leg. Educ. 107 (1948). 
 20. Stewart Macaulay & Henry G. Manne, A Low-Cost Legal Writing Program:  The 
Wisconsin Experience, 11 J. Leg. Educ. 387 (1959). 
 21. Kenneth B. Germain, Legal Writing and Moot Court at Almost No Cost:  The Ken-
tucky Experience 1971–72, 25 J. Leg. Educ. 595 (1973). 
 22. Marjorie Dick Rombauer, First-Year Legal Research and Writing: Then and Now, 
25 J. Leg. Educ. 538 (1973). 
 23. Reed Dickerson, Legal Drafting:  Writing as Thinking, or, Talk-Back from Your 
Draft and How to Exploit It, 29 J. Leg. Educ. 373 (1978). 
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writing, working as writing advisors and legal writing teachers, 
designing programs and curricula, writing articles and legal writ-
ing textbooks, and helping to found the Legal Writing Institute.24 
Out of the disciplines of English composition and literature, 
legal writing scholars first found the voice and the vocabulary—as 
well as the theories and practices—that were necessary to study 
their topic and to write about their teaching.  In time, articles 
about the teaching of legal writing would draw not only on com-
position and literary theory but also on linguistics, classical and 
contemporary rhetoric, and critical theory, including feminist 
theory. 
The view of legal writing as fertile ground awaiting substan-
tive insights from other disciplines was realized in Terry Phelps‘s 
1986 article, The New Legal Rhetoric.25  This article suggested 
that applying composition theory to the teaching of legal writing 
would provide the beginnings of ―a substantive pedagogy that can 
teach law students to write well.‖26  As the article predicted, com-
position theory heavily influenced the teaching of legal writing, 
and the article became an essential introduction to the idea that 
legal writing was itself a field worthy of serious study.   
An early alternative route, pointing toward interpretation as 
well as composition, was discovered when literary theory was ap-
plied in Betsy Fajans and Mollie Falk‘s article, Against the Ty-
ranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts.27  Through this ar-
ticle, the authors pushed legal writing scholarship beyond the 
composition of documents, and into the interpretation of texts, 
suggesting that the application of interpretive techniques—such 
as close reading—might help produce better legal writers.  The 
article explicitly linked interpretation to composition by suggest-
ing ―classroom activities and writing assignments which encour-
age law students to read closely in order to write strongly.‖28 
  
 24. See Jessie Grearson & Anne Enquist, A History of Writing Advisors at Law 
Schools: Looking at Our Past, Looking at Our Future, 5 Leg. Writing 55 (1999). 
 25. Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089 (1986). 
 26. Id. at 1089. 
 27. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking 
Back to Texts, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 163 (1993). 
 28. Id. at 166, 193 (reading for jurisprudential and interpretive posture, reading for 
context, reading for style, reading for narrative, reading for omission). 
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C.   Leap Two: Building a Room of Our Own 
Much of the early discipline building was designed to create a 
community of legal writing professors who were excellent teach-
ers.  Drawing on their experience in other disciplines, professors 
trained in those disciplines helped establish the formal organiza-
tions and publications that provided the essential institutional 
base and information-sharing mechanisms for legal writing 
teachers.29 
First came the ―Conference for People who Teach in or Ad-
minister Legal Writing Programs,‖30 organized by Chris Rideout 
and Laurel Oates at the University of Puget Sound School of Law 
in August 1984.  Out of that conference, the Legal Writing Insti-
tute (LWI) was founded, followed closely by the first Idea Bank 
and Second Draft newsletter.  In 1988, the LWI established Legal 
Writing: The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute to serve as a 
forum for encouraging and publishing scholarship within the de-
veloping discipline of legal writing.31  Chris Rideout served as the 
Journal‘s first Editor in Chief, and the first issue served its discip-
line-building purpose by bringing together the first survey of the 
field32 with a bibliography of books and articles in the field,33 as 
well as substantial articles by rhetoric and composition scholars 
about the effects of teaching and writing practices.  These articles 
about teaching legal writing built not only on the experience of 
teachers in the field but also on research studies of the develop-
ment of writing competencies and of the effects of briefs on pro-
fessional audiences.34  
  
 29. See Mary S. Lawrence, The Legal Writing Institute, The Beginning: Extraordinary 
Vision, Extraordinary Accomplishment, 11 Leg. Writing 213 (2005) (providing the history 
of the establishment of the Legal Writing Institute). 
 30. The speakers were interdisciplinary; they included law professors, judges, and 
professors of English from the University of British Columbia, Oregon State University, 
the University of Texas, and the University of Chicago.  See Conference Brochure, Teach-
ing Legal Writing (1984) (available at http://www.lwionline.org/about/history/brochure 
1984.pdf). 
 31. All issues of the Journal of Legal Writing are available at the Journal‘s website, 
http://journallegalwritinginstitute.org. 
 32. The published report of the 1990 LWI survey is found at Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal 
Writing in the Twenty-First Century: The First Images—A Survey of Legal Research and 
Writing Programs, 1 Leg. Writing 123, 125 (1991). 
 33. George D. Gopen & Kary D. Smout, Legal Writing: A Bibliography, 1 Leg. Writing 
93 (1991). 
 34. James F. Stratman, Teaching Lawyers to Revise for the Real World, A Role for 
Reader Protocols, 1 Leg. Writing 35 (1991); Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal 
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The LWI‘s biennial conferences, surveys, and collections of 
materials and ideas were essential to the establishment of the 
community of teachers, as they brought together diverse teachers, 
concepts, and experts for continuing extensive conversations 
about how we could improve the teaching of legal writing in law 
schools. 
D.   Leap Three: Other Voices, Other Rooms 
The next great leap was powered by early sightings of distant 
and expansive vistas for legal writing scholarship: out there, some 
legal writing professors envisioned new purposes, new audiences, 
and new sources of theory and research.35  When we changed di-
rection from focusing exclusively on how to teach legal writing to 
the broader view of how to study and write about legal writing, 
we imagined a perspective for our professional lives as legal writ-
ing professors.  Several projects helped legal writing professors at 
this crossroads, including the series of legal discourse colloquia 
organized by Terry Phelps and Linda Edwards; these introduced 
authors to scholarly habits, knowledge, and mentors that would 
guide their subsequent work.  
New disciplines provided modes and methods for enriching 
our teaching and our understanding of our students.  For exam-
ple, linguistics theory was applied to the composition of legal doc-
uments in the Fajans and Falk article, Linguistics and the Com-
position of Legal Documents.36  Feminist theory was the starting 
point for Kathryn M. Stanchi‘s analysis in Feminist Legal Writ-
ing.37  There, she suggested that the exploration of feminist legal 
writing might enrich ―the conventional wisdom that defines legal 
  
Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 Leg. Writing 1 (1991); see also George 
D. Gopen, The Professor and the Professionals: Teaching Writing to Lawyers and Judges, 1 
Leg. Writing 79 (1991). 
 35. The Legal Studies Forum published a special legal writing scholarship issue in 
1996, The New Legal Writing Scholarship, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 1 (1996).  It included such 
interdisciplinary pieces as Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic 
Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 7 (1996); James R. Elkins, What 
Kind of Story Is Legal Writing? 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 95 (1996); Philip N. Meyer, ―The 
Exploding Frog‖: A Legal Writing Teacher’s Dream, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 137 (1996); Kate 
O‘Neill, Formalism and Syllogisms: A Pragmatic Critique of Writing in Law School, 20 
Leg. Stud. Forum 51 (1996); and Teresa Godwin Phelps, Tradition, Discipline & Creativity: 
Developing ―Strong Poets‖ in Legal Writing, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 89 (1996). 
 36. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Linguistics and the Composition of Legal Docu-
ments: Border Crossings, 22 Leg. Stud. Forum 697 (1998). 
 37.  Kathryn M. Stanchi, Feminist Legal Writing, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 387 (2002). 
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writing, persuasion, and persuasive writing.‖38  Similarly, Jessica 
E. Price, in Imagining the Law-Trained Reader: the Faulty De-
scription of the Audience in Legal Writing Textbooks, explored 
critical theory, in particular, the ideas of a ―‗situated legal writer‘ 
who must ‗instead learn to write in a new institutional setting, 
learn a whole new local practice, and react positively to new and 
changing circumstances.‘‖39  
In addition to supporting scholarship about teaching legal 
writing, the new disciplines helped other legal writing professors 
shift their scholarship from composition to interpretation.  By ap-
plying theories derived from linguistics, classical and contempo-
rary rhetoric, social science, and cognitive science, this scholar-
ship explained how and why particular texts were rhetorically 
effective.40  
Connecting and engaging with other professional audiences 
was one part of Michael Smith‘s argument that our scholarship 
should address the ―substance‖ of legal writing and be written for 
the broader audience of professional legal writers, including law-
yers, judges, students, and other academics.41  The mission of en-
couraging and publishing scholarship based on the study and 
practice of professional legal writing was reflected in a new peer-
edited journal established in 2002, the Journal of the Association 
of Legal Writing Directors (J. ALWD).42  
  
 38. Id. 
 39. Jessica E. Price, Imagining the Law-Trained Reader: The Faulty Description of the 
Audience in Legal Writing Textbooks, 16 Widener L.J. 983, 1022 (2007). 
 40. See for example, the articles cited in Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal 
Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ALWD 129 (2006). 
 41. Smith, supra n. 2, at 5–18, 20–22. 
 42. All issues of the Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors are available 
at the ALWD website, http://www.alwd.org/jalwd.html. 
  For a description of ALWD‘s efforts to establish legal writing as a discipline and as 
a profession, see Smith, supra n. 2, at 2.  The article describes five initiatives:  (1) organiz-
ing legal writing directors and creating mechanisms to share information; (2) offering 
support to established and new legal writing professionals; (3) seeking to improve the 
status and working conditions of legal writing professionals; (4) revolutionizing legal cita-
tion with the publication of the ALWD Citation Manual; and (5) founding J. ALWD.  Id. at 
2–4.  Noting that ―[t]he purpose of the Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Direc-
tors (J. ALWD) is to develop scholarship focusing on the substance of professional legal 
writing and to make that scholarship accessible and helpful to practitioners as well as to 
legal writing teachers,‖ the article characterizes as a bold move the decision against ―pro-
ducing a journal on legal writing in general‖ and instead ―to dedicate this Journal to one 
specific genre of legal writing scholarship: scholarship that explores the substance of legal 
writing.‖  Id. at 3–4; see also Erasing Lines: Integrating the Law School Curriculum—
Proceedings from the 2001 ALWD Conference, 1 J. ALWD 1 (2002) [hereinafter Erasing 
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Finally, the expansion of our scholarship to ―other voices‖ and 
―other rooms‖ prompted conferences and workshops whose point 
was to encourage scholarship and to discuss specific subjects as-
sociated with professional legal writing, such as rhetoric, persua-
sion, and storytelling.43  Supporting the creation of this communi-
ty of scholars are such efforts as the LWI Writers‘ Workshops, 
held every summer, and the ALWD Scholars‘ Workshops and Fo-
rums, conducted as part of regional legal writing conferences. 
E.   Glimpsing the Presence of a Discipline 
Establishing common ground is the basis of a discipline.  In 
different ways, traditional scholarly publications—especially peer-
reviewed journals—and the newer, essentially unedited, electron-
ic forms of distribution44 help build this foundation.  They are the 
way that we establish a consensus among scholars about what we 
are studying as well as the sense that we have shared beliefs and 
methods, common ancestors, and some agreement on canonical 
components.  In recent years, publication of many legal writing 
bibliographies, as well as LWI‘s establishment of a monograph 
series,45 reflect the beginnings of such agreements.  Our journals 
foster a sense of common beliefs and methods.  As we expand from 
legal writing texts to writing extensively about the subjects of our 
study and practice, for audiences including other academics and 
practicing lawyers as well as students, we more firmly establish 
the knowledge base of a discipline. 
  
Lines]; The Politics of Legal Writing—Proceedings of a Conference for Legal Research and 
Writing Program Directors, http://www.alwd.org/publications/pdf/LRW_PoliticsofLegal 
Writing.pdf (July 28–29, 1995).  The 1995 conference was the first conference of legal writ-
ing directors, and it led directly to the creation of ALWD. 
 43. The ―applied storytelling‖ movement has so far resulted in two conferences and a 
number of published articles; American University and Mercer University have sponsored 
workshops on the relationship of law and rhetoric; and Rutgers University has sponsored a 
conference on persuasion.  See Applied Legal Storytelling: Chapter Two, http://www 
.lclark.edu/law/programs/legal_analysis_and_writing/applied_legal_storytelling_         
conference/ (accessed Apr. 27, 2010); Am. U., Wash. College of L., How Legal Rhetoric 
Shapes the Law, http://www.wcl.american.edu/legalrhetoric/podcast.cfm (last updated Jan. 
7, 2010, at 12:38 p.m.); Mercer U. Sch. of L., Legal Writing through a Rhetorical Lens, 
http:// law.mercer.edu/lawandrhetoric/ (accessed Apr. 27, 2010).   
 44. SSRN distributes subject matter eJournals containing both draft and published 
articles, essays, and comments on Legal Writing and Law & Rhetoric.  
 45. See e.g. Leg. Writing Inst. Monograph Series, The Art of Critiquing Written Work 
vol. 1, http://www.lwionline.org/monograph_volume_one.html (accessed April 19, 2010). 
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Through their rapidly increasing size, shifting subject matter, 
and expanding scope, our bibliographies show how far we have 
come—from building a community of teachers to constructing an 
intellectual community of scholars.  The purpose of the early bib-
liographies was to help teachers learn to teach; now, legal writing 
bibliographies focus also on providing a knowledge base for our 
scholarship.46  In the first issue of Legal Writing, George Gopen 
and Kary Smout listed 409 articles and 103 books, more than half 
published between 1980 and 1991.47  When Linda Edwards and 
Terry Pollman published their compilation of scholarship by legal 
writing professors in Legal Writing in 2005, their bibliography 
contained entries for more than 300 authors, including more than 
350 books, book chapters, and supplements; more than 650 ar-
ticles in student-edited law reviews; and at least that many ar-
ticles in peer-reviewed journals, specialty journals, and other 
kinds of publications.48  At that time, only about 25 percent of the 
law review articles legal writing professors had published were 
about legal writing topics.49 
By some measurements, legal writing already has established 
itself as a discipline.  Among the marks of a discipline, legal writ-
ing can claim the following: (1) dedicated and peer-reviewed jour-
nals (Legal Writing and J. ALWD, as well as related journals, 
newsletters, and other publications); (2) two flagship organiza-
tions (the LWI and ALWD, as well as a number of related organi-
  
 46. The teaching-related bibliographies included Bibliography of Books, Articles, and 
Periodicals on Legal Writing Programs and Instruction, to accompany Commun. Skills 
Comm., Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B., Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs (Eric B. 
Easton ed., 2d ed., ABA 2006) (bibliography available at http://www.abanet.org/           
legaled/publications/sourcebook/sourcebookbibliography.pdf); the bibliography in Commun. 
Skills Comm., Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B., Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs 149–
174 (Ralph L. Brill et al. eds., ABA 1997); and bibliographies published in Terence Collins 
& Darryl Hattenburger, Law and Language:  A Selected Annotated Bibliography on Legal 
Writing, 33 J. Leg. Educ. 141 (1983); Elkins, supra n. 16; Gopen & Smout, supra n. 33. 
  For bibliographies with a broader scope, see e.g., Pollman & Edwards, supra n. 2; 
Smith, supra n. 2; Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion:  An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ALWD 
75 (2009); Carrie W. Teitcher, Legal Writing Beyond Memos and Briefs: An Annotated 
Bibliography, 5 J. ALWD 133 (2008).  
 47. Gopen & Smout, supra n. 33, at 93. 
 48. Pollman & Edwards, supra n. 2, at 15. 
 49. According to the most recent ALWD–LWI survey, legal writing professors at 146 
schools are either required or encouraged to produce written scholarship.  ALWD & Leg. 
Writing Inst., 2008 Survey Results 62 (2008) (available at http://www.alwd.org 
/surveys/survey_results/2008_Survey_Results.pdf) [hereinafter 2008 Survey Results]. Legal 
writing teachers are eligible for summer research grants at 100 schools. Id. at 60. 
File: Galley Berger Edwards Pullman 6-18-10B.docx Created on: 6/18/2010 5:59:00 PM Last Printed: 6/18/2010 6:00:00 PM 
2002] The Past, Presence, and Future of Legal Writing Scholarship 533 
zations); (3) a listserv supporting the community (again, we have 
two as well as a blog); (4) dedicated conferences (a major confe-
rence every year, sponsored by either LWI or ALWD, as well as 
many regional and specialty conferences); and (5) people who call 
themselves professional legal writing teachers and scholars. In 
the next section, we turn to building that community of scholars. 
II.   OUR PRESENT AND OUR PRESENCE:  MID-COURSE 
ASSESSMENT  
Now that we are seriously engaged in building our discipline, 
we should consider the kind of scholarship that can help us with 
that project.  What are its characteristics?  What is the nature of 
the enterprise, and how we are doing with it?  In the first part, we 
described the paths so far taken, the inherited language and con-
text of our scholarship.50  In this part, we suggest some ways in 
which legal writing professors are modifying and re-arranging 
what they have inherited, and we begin to explore the ―rhetorical 
community‖ that is created by our scholarship.  What kind of per-
son is speaking here?  To what kind of person?  What kind of voice 
is used?  What kind of response is invited or allowed?  Where do I 
fit in this community?51 
A.   Writing as Conversation 
Because writing is usually done alone, it may seem that writ-
ing is an individual enterprise—a lone writer at a keyboard think-
ing and recording great thoughts.  But in fact, everything we 
write is generated from a body of ongoing work by others and will 
be presented to others to become a part of a shared discourse. 
Perhaps a helpful metaphor is to think of writing as conver-
sation rather than as speech-making.52  Imagine a room full of 
  
 50. See White, supra n. 7, at 695. 
 51. Id. at 701–702. 
 52. Although not the source of the image in this article, it may be interesting to com-
pare Kenneth Burke‘s unending conversation metaphor: 
Imagine that you enter a parlor.  You come late.  When you arrive, others have long 
preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too heated 
for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about.  In fact, the discussion had 
already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is qualified 
to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before.  You listen for a while, until you 
decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. 
Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns 
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people engaged in a conversation.  The door opens and a hypo-
thetical professor (let‘s call her Professor Akin) walks into the 
room.  The conversation continues as Professor Akin takes a seat.  
If we think of the ongoing conversation as our scholarship, what 
is the best way for Professor Akin to join that conversation?  How 
can both she and the assembled group best help the shared con-
versation progress?  
First, Professor Akin should take a seat and listen for a 
while.  She should find out what the group is discussing and who 
is saying what.  Perhaps she should ask the person sitting next to 
her what was said before she entered the room.  Once she has a 
good idea of the content of the conversation so far, she can begin 
to participate.  When she does, she should try to add something 
new.  The conversation will not progress if she merely reports to 
the group what others have already said.  Imagine Professor Akin 
taking the floor, saying ―X said this; Y said that; Z made this oth-
er point‖ and then sitting down.  That would be rather strange 
conversational behavior.  In a conversation, the speaker is taking 
up talking time, during which no one else can speak.  Part of her 
implicit promise to her listeners is that she will make good use of 
the time by moving the discussion forward somehow. 
But Professor Akin should mention part of what has already 
been said because she should relate her new points to the points 
already made.  She might agree with some points and offer new 
reasons in support.  She might agree with part of a prior comment 
but disagree with another part.  She would, of course, explain her 
reasons for agreeing and disagreeing.  She might make a new 
point entirely, saying that the conversation so far has not consi-
dered a significant aspect of the topic.  When she finishes her 
comment, she should listen again, waiting to see what others will 
say about her thoughts and what impact those thoughts will have 
on the direction of the conversation.  
The other members of the group have conversational duties 
as well, duties that will help advance the shared conversation.  
Group members should listen to Professor Akin when she stands 
  
himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent, 
depending upon the quality of your ally's assistance.  However, the discussion is in-
terminable.  The hour grows late, you must depart.  And you do depart, with the dis-
cussion still vigorously in progress. 
Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form 110–111 (U. Cal. Press 1973). 
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to speak.  They should not be busy working on what they will say 
next and therefore ignoring the conversation going on around 
them.  They should listen with an open mind, willing to be con-
vinced of something new.  But they should also be willing to offer 
a different perspective, perhaps tweaking the new idea or perhaps 
disagreeing entirely.  If a listener disagrees (let‘s call him Profes-
sor Brown), he should share his perspective and explain his rea-
sons.  The group is searching for the best answer, after all.  Per-
haps the best answer is somewhere between the ideas offered by 
Professors Akin and Brown.  The group may never reach the best 
answer if Professor Brown is not willing to share his different 
perspective. 
Disagreement in a conversation can be uncomfortable, of 
course, so Professor Brown will be sure to treat both Professor 
Akin and her ideas with respect.  In fact, Professor Brown may 
affirm the importance of Professor Akin‘s ideas explicitly.  He also 
affirms their importance implicitly by taking them seriously 
enough to warrant further exploration.  After Professor Brown 
finishes speaking, Professor Akin may speak again, responding to 
Professor Brown‘s comments.  She will treat Professor Brown and 
his ideas with respect as well.  Being human, she may feel some 
discomfort, but she is also grateful for the chance to further ex-
plore her own perspective, a chance she may not have had if no 
one had disagreed.  Other members of the group will offer their 
own thoughts on the disagreement between Professors Akin and 
Brown, and they will share their own new ideas as well.  And on 
the conversation goes.  
B.   The Duties of Writers and Audiences: A Mid-Course Check  
All of us have participated in oral group deliberations like 
this one.  With this kind of full, thoughtful, broad, and respectful 
participation, all of the participants will know a great deal more 
and will understand the topic much more deeply than any one of 
them ever could alone.  This model works well for our scholarship 
too.  A number of characteristics at work in the model conversa-
tion apply equally to scholarly writing.  
First, the writer has responsibilities to others.  She does tho-
rough research, finding out what has been said before she entered 
the conversation, but she does not simply repeat what already has 
been said.  When she writes, she impliedly promises her future 
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readers that she will make good use of their reading time, so she 
makes new points rather than merely filing a transcript of the 
conversation to date.  She does not ignore the points of others, 
however.  Instead, she places her own new points in the context of 
what has already been said.  She knows that others may disagree 
with part of all of her idea, and she is willing to hear disagree-
ment.  In fact, she welcomes disagreement as an opportunity to 
delve even more deeply into the subject.  
Readers have responsibilities as well.  They should read 
openly and from within the text, hoping to be persuaded of some-
thing new.53  Even if they have written about the topic them-
selves, they welcome a new participant to the conversation.  They 
know that no one owns a topic.  The more the topic is explored, 
the deeper the group‘s ultimate understanding will be and the 
more important each writer‘s own contributions will be to that 
understanding.  But readers should be willing to disagree too, in 
order to assist with the group‘s shared goal of finding the best 
answer to an interesting question.  When the readers again write, 
they place their own new comments in the context of the new 
comments of recent writers too, treating those comments with 
respect as well.  Readers have the responsibility of remaining cur-
rent in the literature of the field, for productive response to a 
writer‘s new work must be grounded in a broad knowledge of the 
field‘s preexisting scholarly work.  Keeping current in the litera-
ture is necessary not only to respond professionally to new pub-
lished work but also to fulfill the crucially important responsibili-
ty of mentoring new scholarship before it is published.  Mentoring 
requires the willingness to read drafts and to provide honest and 
thoughtful feedback based on literacy in the field itself.  
How are we in the legal writing community doing with these 
criteria?  Are our articles well researched?  Many are.  Certainly 
professors who teach research should produce well-researched 
articles, and often that is the case in our community.  But we are 
still in the midst of a transition from an earlier era, when re-
search was not always deemed so important.  Perhaps in that  
earlier era, the literature was not as developed as it is today.  
  
 53. Maksymilian Del Mar has written eloquently of this ethic of reading, suggesting 
that we should enter the world of the text, assuming the role of ―companions around a 
dinner table, sharing wine amongst inquisitive friends, as in Plato‘s symposiums.‖  Del 
Mar, supra n. 5, at 7. 
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Perhaps we were still taking the first steps toward becoming a 
discipline, so we had not yet established the necessary research 
ethic.  But those early days are past, and today it is critically im-
portant to read and cite thoroughly.  Today‘s work builds on the 
work of those who came before us.  Our challenge is to extend the 
national conversation by citing to relevant work produced both 
inside and outside our own field.  
Are we making new points?  Largely, yes.  The second genera-
tion of legal writing scholarship is vastly more sophisticated and 
creative than was the first generation as a whole.  Part of what 
makes legal writing scholarship so exciting today is the amount of 
new territory to be explored, and as a community, we have begun 
that exciting work.  No doubt the third generation will produce 
even more new ideas, relying upon the work that has gone before 
but deepening the level of analysis and understanding. 
Are we recognizing the shared nature of scholarship by seek-
ing feedback from a variety of readers before publication?  Collec-
tively, we may need some improvement on this score.  We expect 
our students to use the feedback process to improve their work, 
but we do not always listen to our own teaching.  In recent years, 
one of the authors has had the opportunity to observe well-
mentored new faculty members in other fields.  They have 
learned to use the writing process to perfect a work.  These new 
scholars write a first draft that may be so rough that many legal 
writing teachers would be embarrassed to show it to a mentor.  
But these inexperienced authors choose carefully how to send the 
draft around: first to the two or three most trusted friends who 
will not judge them on the basis of bad beginnings; then to ever 
more sophisticated circles of friends, colleagues, and mentors.  By 
the time the article gets to the author‘s most discerning and ex-
perienced mentor, it looks very good.  The mentor is impressed 
and in a good position to praise the author to others.  Even more 
important, the paper is developed enough to evoke a sophisticated 
response, and the author is intellectually and psychologically 
ready to understand and incorporate these more sophisticated 
responses.  In each round of comment, authors take suggestions 
seriously.  And those drafts—that started out as terribly written 
as any second-semester law student‘s zero draft—become wonder-
ful articles published in prestigious journals.  
We know from our teaching that this is how feedback works, 
but legal writing teachers often do not take full advantage of the 
File: Galley Berger Edwards Pullman 6-18-10B.docx Created on:  6/18/2010 5:59:00 PM Last Printed: 6/18/2010 6:00:00 PM 
538 The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute [Vol. 16 
rhetorical community we are building.  We hesitate to ask some-
one to read a draft because we know it is imperfect, thus fore-
going the help of those we could trust.  The unfinished draft in-
vites comment; the ―perfected draft‖ says to the responder, ―I‘ve 
put so much work into this already, I just want some trifling 
comments that will be easy to fix.‖ Seeking feedback earlier in the 
process gives both author and responder space to grow. The res-
ponder can (and definitely should) provide honest substantive 
feedback, not just a cosmetic edit and a note saying what the res-
ponder thinks the author wants to hear.  As any first-year stu-
dent knows, we in the legal writing community are a notoriously 
discerning audience, with plenty of suggestions for how to im-
prove a document.  Our scholarship will only get better if we re-
member to seek feedback from others in the field.  
Are we welcoming new scholars into the shared conversation, 
glad when they make points we had not considered?  Almost al-
ways, yes.  Our community is clearly one of the most supportive 
academic communities in existence.  It is, of course, an under-
standable human reaction to feel a little threatened when a new 
voice enters the discussion on a particular topic, making new 
points or taking a different approach, but as members of this 
warm and welcoming community, we put that momentary feeling 
aside.  We know that there is far more knowledge to be uncovered 
and explored than anyone can manage alone.  We are, after all, in 
this together.  
But not surprisingly, we have trouble with the hardest part of 
the conversational model—being willing to disagree with each 
other and be disagreed with in return.  The provocative voice is 
not always welcome within our community.  We are reluctant to 
disagree with each other, particularly in print.  Mature dis-
ciplines are not afraid of disagreement.  In fact, the more scholars 
disagree, the more good scholarship is produced. As our discipline 
moves toward maturity, we need to become more accustomed to 
healthy professional disagreement.  
Of course, every individual author, no matter the discipline, 
would prefer unequivocal praise of her ideas.  No doubt the same 
is true within the legal writing community.  But the problem is 
greater and far more complicated in marginalized academic com-
munities struggling for full acceptance—communities like ours.  
In our example above, if Professor Akin is on a tenure-track or 
working toward a long-term contract, how should Professor 
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Brown feel about disagreeing with her contribution to the scholar-
ly conversation?  If he takes issue with some of her points, might 
his disagreement be used by others to advance an agenda in oppo-
sition to legal writing professionals at Professor Akin‘s personal 
expense?  
We must be honest and say that this fear can be legitimate. 
The same kinds of scholarly disagreements that would be ex-
pected as a matter of course in mainstream disciplines can be 
made to appear much more serious in the hands of those hostile 
to equal status for legal writing.  This fear should not prevent us 
from undertaking a vibrant scholarly conversation in which we 
speak our views honestly, but it should inform the way in which 
we frame our disagreements.  
Like all marginalized communities, legal writing professors 
have two distinct audiences, one inside the discipline and one out-
side its membership.  The rhetorical task of writing truthfully 
with these two audiences simultaneously in mind can be difficult. 
In that situation, Professor Brown should walk a carefully bal-
anced line, stating his disagreement honestly but underlining the 
value of Professor Akin‘s own points so the outside audience does 
not misunderstand his point.  The value of an article, after all, is 
not a question of agreement or disagreement with content.  Some 
of the most important work in a discipline can be work that chal-
lenges commonly held beliefs.  If the work is well-researched and 
filled with creative new insights, the work deserves high praise, 
no matter whether any particular reader is ultimately persuaded 
on each and every point.  And for her part, as difficult as it may 
be, Professor Akin should not consider disagreement a breach of 
loyalty to the discipline but rather a sign that the discipline is 
growing up and taking its rightful place in the academy.  
Finally, are we encouraging a vibrant rhetorical community 
by staying current in the legal writing literature?  Reading and 
writing are connected.  Both are negotiated processes as readers 
and authors engage in an inner dialogue to make meaning.54  In 
fact, some in describing the writing process talk about assuming 
different roles—becoming different people—as the writing takes 
shape.55  If this inner dialogue is to be useful to the intellectual 
  
 54. See Berger, supra n. 4, at 155–157; Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or 
Building a Discipline?  Talking About Legal Writing, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 887 (2002). 
 55. See e.g. Bryan Garner, Legal Writing in Plain English 5–7 (U. Chi. Press 2001). 
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life of the field, however, it must lead to the public dialogue, the 
conversation.  The legal writing community has a strong ethic of 
sharing.56  As we understand the value of collaboration in sharing 
teaching ideas, we should recognize that transforming the writer‘s 
inner dialogue to a public conversation is critical for the intellec-
tual life of the field.  And as noted earlier, unless one is familiar 
with the body of legal writing literature, it is difficult to make 
useful contributions.  
Many of the barriers that make it difficult to write also im-
pede reading. It is easy to put aside the responsibility to read 
scholarship when you are busy reading literally thousands of pag-
es of student work each semester.57  And perhaps it is because the 
legal writing community has had frequent and vibrant confe-
rences, and an active listserv, that we have not always depended 
on reading articles for the national conversation.58  Those who 
have been in the field a long time may decide there is little new 
for them in scholarship—they have ―seen it all before.‖  This feel-
ing is exacerbated in legal writing because for many years, caps 
on the number of years teachers could stay in a position led to 
turnover and a continual influx of new teachers.59  New teachers 
rediscovered old ideas and often presented the already explored 
ideas as if they were new and fresh.  Now that the second-
generation legal scholars have begun to produce more sophisti-
cated and original work, experienced legal writing professors may 
  
Garner describes four roles an author assumes in the writing process, as they have been 
delineated by Dr. Betty Sue Flowers:  The Madman, The Architect, The Carpenter, and 
The Judge. Id. at 5–7.  Garner writes about the roles almost as if the author were four, 
different people who serially assume responsibility for the piece of writing.  Id. at 6.  This 
metaphor supplies a vivid image of the internal dialogue that occurs as we write.  
 56. One example of this ethic is the ―Idea Bank,‖ a site to share assignments and 
teaching ideas on the Legal Writing Institute‘s website at http://www.lwionline.org/ 
idea_bank.html. 
 57. 2008 Survey Results, supra n. 49, at 63. The average pages of student work read by 
legal writing professors is 1,483, but some read more than 4,000.  
 58. The Legal Writing Institute has held biennial conferences since 1984. Leg. Writing 
Inst., History, http://www.lwionline.org/history.html (accessed Apr. 19, 2010). The Associa-
tion of Legal Writing Directors has held conferences in the intervening years since 1999.  
In addition, both organizations maintain active listservs.  
 59. Capping the number of years that a legal writing professor could stay at one law 
school was a common practice that has begun to disappear in the last fifteen years.  See 
e.g. Jo Anne Durako, A Snapshot of Legal Writing Programs at the Millennium, 6 Leg. 
Writing 95, 112 (2000); Mary Lawrence, An Interview with Marjorie Rombauer, 9 Leg. 
Writing 19, 29 (2001).  Recently, economic pressures appear to have encouraged a few law 
schools to again establish short-term positions for legal writing professors as visitors or 
teaching fellows. 
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have failed to develop the habit of reading new work.  Novice 
teachers stand to gain even more by reading regularly in their 
field.  Developing a habit of reading the emerging third genera-
tion of legal writing scholars will offer rewards to both the indi-
vidual reader and the greater rhetorical communities individual 
readers will create. 
C.   Rhetorical Communities 
1.  Our Audiences 
Choosing an audience is a key question for any scholar.  In 
the legal academy, the question of who makes up the primary au-
dience for legal scholarship has been controversial.  Many assume 
that authors intend the primary audience of scholarship to be 
judges, because scholars hope to influence the courts.60  Others 
argue that scholars should write for other scholars in the legal 
academy, perhaps because they are eager to join the national con-
versation among scholars that shapes the education of genera-
tions of lawyers.61  Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk accept 
both of those audiences as important, but urge scholars to broa-
den their view of possible audiences for their work.62  
In the legal writing community, when the question of au-
dience arises, we most often identify only two audiences—an ―in-
side‖ audience and an ―outside‖ audience.  The ―inside‖ audience 
is the legal writing community, in which members have tradition-
ally placed a high value on uncritical support.  The ―outside‖ au-
dience, in contrast, is other law professors and members of tenure 
committees, who are more likely to be critical, adversarial, and 
even threatening to job security.  The outside audience is often 
feared.63  
  
 60. The often-cited article articulating this viewpoint, and lamenting the lack of inter-
est in the academy about writing for judges is Harry T. Edwards, supra n. 10. 
 61. See e.g. Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic Discipline:  Law 
Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. Leg. Educ. 471 (2004); see also 
Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Training and Scholarship, 91 U. 
Mich. L. Rev. 1921 (1993) (agreeing in measure with Judge Edwards‘s arguments for more 
doctrinal legal scholarship but defending the interdisciplinary scholarship, especially Law 
and Economics scholarship).  
 62. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, In Defense of the Big Tent: The Importance 
of Recognizing the Many Audiences of Legal Scholarship, 34 Tulsa L.J. 667, 675 (1999).  
 63. Other ―outsider‖ groups, such as critical race scholars, have written about two 
audiences referring to the ―imperial scholar‖ who writes high theory compared to more 
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This fear of a critical audience is destructive on many levels.  
The fear of a critical or derisive response may be one of reasons 
some legal writing professors do not write.64  It may also inspire 
the paradoxical position of some legal writing professors who deny 
the value of scholarly writing.  Like the law professor who comes 
to teaching to escape the practice of law and cannot avoid showing 
students disdain for practicing lawyers, some legal writing teach-
ers teach writing but do not write and cannot avoid showing their 
disdain for academic legal writing. 
Those legal writing professors who do engage in scholarship 
may face frustrations regarding their choice of audience.  If they 
choose to focus on either the ―inside‖ or ―outside‖ audience to the 
detriment of the other, they will limit the scope and reach of their 
project.  Some will write only for the ―safe‖ audience of the legal 
writing community of scholars.  Others will write only what is 
acceptable to a tenure committee, ignoring the rapidly developing 
body of literature in the legal writing field.  Each of these choices 
may make sense at various times because the rewards and dan-
gers posed by ―outside‖ audiences are real.  Thus, despite how 
stultifying ―we/they‖ thinking can be, sometimes it may be neces-
sary for a group like legal writing professors who often still en-
counter barriers to full status within the legal academy.65  
Further, differences in the ―inside‖ and ―outside‖ audiences go 
beyond the usual dichotomy faced by scholars in more established 
areas.  One of the difficulties of writing for an ―outside‖ audience 
is that many in the legal academy never had the experience af-
forded by a modern legal writing program.  Law schools hire most 
of their faculty members from elite schools.66  Elite schools are 
  
traditional doctrinal analysis. See e.g. Kevin Johnson, Race Matters, Immigration Law and 
Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 
2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 525. 
 64. In addition to the fear of harsh criticism, legal writing teachers face other difficul-
ties that also explain why they may not write.  Teaching writing is extraordinarily labor 
intensive.  Marking papers, conferencing with students, and creating new assignments 
year after year takes time.  Finding time to write during the school year is difficult, if not 
impossible.  Summers are often devoted to developing assignments or to summer teaching 
to supplement salaries that as a rule are lower than the rest of the permanent faculty‘s.  
See generally 2008 Survey Results, supra n. 49, at 62. 
 65. See e.g. Kristen Konrad Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education:  Un-
derstanding the Schism between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty 3 J. ALWD 106, 106–
110 (2003).  
 66. A study of new faculty hired between 1996 and 2000 found that just over 86 per-
cent of them came from the top 25 law schools.  Richard E. Redding, Where Did You Go to 
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often least likely to offer a well-developed legal writing program.67  
Thus, many law faculty who received their law degree from elite 
schools are just not familiar with the kinds of rhetorical and 
communication theories now being applied in the legal writing 
classroom.  
While the perils involved in writing for an ―outside‖ audience 
are real, significant hazards also complicate writing for the ―in-
side‖ legal writing audience.  Although inroads into the main-
stream of scholarship are evident,68 one risk may be a smaller and 
less influential readership, a risk that will not have escaped the 
thinking of faculty in other fields.  Anecdotal evidence supports 
the conclusion that tenure committees and faculties sometimes 
discount legal writing articles; even more troubling, it is possible 
that some faculties when considering tenure for legal writing pro-
fessors discount evaluative letters from other legal writing scho-
lars.  
―We/they thinking‖ limits audiences, which limits choices.  
Legal writing scholars may miss the chance to influence judges 
and practitioners.  And legal writing scholars do write articles 
that matter to judges and practitioners;69 in fact, scholarship 
written for the professional legal writing audience of judges and 
lawyers is a target audience for several of our journals (J. ALWD 
and Scribes). Another important phenomenon is that judges 
themselves often choose to write about legal writing when they 
  
Law School?  Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education, 
53 J. Leg. Educ. 594 (2003).  
 67. Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century:  A Sharper Image, 2 
Leg. Writing 1 (1996) (summarizing the results of Legal Writing Institute‘s survey with a 
heading reading: ―The Higher the Tier, the Less Professionalized the Legal Writing Pro-
gram‖).  This may be changing as more top-tier schools have re-evaluated legal writing 
programs in the last ten years.  
 68. For example, the popular Legal Writing Prof Blog, part of the Law Professors 
Blogs Network has a growing readership.  The blog posted the largest gains in both page 
views and visitors in 2008.  Leg. Writing Prof Blog, Legal Writing Prof Blog Wins Most 
Improved Player Award Redux, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwriting/2010/01/ 
legal-writing-prof-blog-wins-most-improved-player-award-redux.html (Jan. 22, 2010).  
Recently, the blog posted a notice that it had surpassed the half million mark on page 
views.  Leg. Writing Profs. Blog, Half Million Page Views, http:lawprofessors.typepad 
.com/legalwriting/2010/01/half-a-million-page-views.html (Jan. 30, 2010).  
 69. There are too many to list.  See e.g. Ruth Anne Robbins, Painting with Print: In-
corporating Concepts of Typographic and Layout Design into the Text of Legal Writing 
Documents, 2 J. ALWD 108 (2004); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of 
Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 381 (2008). 
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publish articles and books.70  It is logical to assume that when 
judges write these articles and books, they hope for a broader au-
dience beyond other legal writing scholars.  
Pleasing a tenure committee or traditional faculty may lead 
legal writing professors to choose topics outside the field, and this 
choice may stunt the growth of the national conversation on legal 
writing.  A similar danger lies in legal writing scholars choosing 
only topics that the legal writing community will support and find 
non-threatening.  Avoiding the ―provocative voice‖ impoverishes 
the entire legal writing community.  
Thus, a new generation of legal writing scholars may wish to 
reserve the notion of ―insiders‖ and ―outsiders‖ for those political 
times that make such thinking necessary, such as when a legal 
writing professor is in the middle of a troubled tenure process.  
But in other times, we can seek opportunities to expand our     
imagined rhetorical community with the choice of an audience 
beyond the ―we/they‖ duality that has grown out of years of 
second-class citizenship in many law schools.  Some speak of eval-
uating and defining scholarship through the ―validation of our 
peers.‖71  If this is true for the legal academy, legal writing pro-
fessors must begin to think of themselves as peers of non-legal 
writing faculty in the legal academy, and of our rhetorical com-
munity as larger than the legal writing world.  Recent social 
science research into questions of motivation may suggest other 
important factors to consider about ourselves as writers.  
2.   Ourselves 
Social science research on motivation suggests that in addi-
tion to the more conventional factors involved in beginning a work 
of scholarship, legal writing professors should consider choosing a 
topic and audience that personally satisfies them, and they 
should strive to maintain autonomy in their work.  Choosing a 
personally satisfying topic will ignite their curiosity and internal 
  
 70. See e.g. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing (2d ed., AuthorHouse 2009); Antonin 
Scalia & Brian Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges (Thomson/West 
2008).  
 71. Other disciplines often use this ―peer validation‖ as defining scholarship.  See e.g. 
Corly Brooke, Defining Scholarly Teaching and the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning 
(SOTL), http://www.ag.iastate.edu/agcoll/PDF/Brooke%20College%20of%20AG%20SOTL% 
2007.pdf (Apr. 5, 2007). 
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desire to learn about the topic, to contribute to a particular com-
munity of scholars, and accordingly will make them more produc-
tive scholars, more likely to succeed. 
A key branch of motivational theory examines whether moti-
vation is internal or external and whether the difference affects 
the level of motivation.72  Intrinsic motivation derives from the 
task itself and the actor‘s reaction to it.73  It is ―manifested both 
as enhanced performance, persistence, and creativity and as 
heightened vitality, self-esteem, and general well-being.‖74  It may 
involve more interest, enjoyment, and confidence.75  Conversely, 
when actors are externally motivated, they respond primarily to 
secure a reward, or to avoid a loss or harm.76  Studies in this area 
suggest that those who engage in tasks based on internal motiva-
tion are likely to spend more time on the task and experience 
more success with it, while external rewards often hinder motiva-
tion.77  
Applied to the context of legal writing scholarship, these stu-
dies suggest that scholars will flourish when they respond to their 
intrinsic desires regarding what they have to say and to whom 
they wish to say it.  Specifically, legal writing scholars are likely 
to write more and find greater satisfaction in scholarship if they 
write to please themselves.  Intrinsically motivated scholarship is 
more likely to be creative and complete.  This comports, for exam-
ple, with the often repeated advice to choose a topic that one 
  
 72. In the 1960s, social scientists examining motivation in the workplace developed 
models to examine the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation.  Mary-
lene Gagne & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and Work Motivation, 26 J. 
Organiz. Behav. 331, 331 (2005).  Although this article focuses on self-determination 
theory, there are many theories of motivation.  See generally id. at 340–345 (comparing 
Self-Determination theory to other motivation theories).  Psychologists Edward L. Deci 
and Richard M. Ryan have written extensively about the differences between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation.  See e.g. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation and 
Self-Determination in Human Behavior (Plenum Press 1985).  Their work on intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation is closely allied with their self-determination theory, which posits that 
individuals who feel they are in control rather than constantly responding to outside de-
mands enjoy more satisfaction and a better sense of well being.  Id. at 29–32. 
 73. Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilita-
tion of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 Am. Psychol. 68, 69 
(Jan. 2000).  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Extrinsic motivation can also vary in how much it evokes a feeling of choice.  See 
generally id. at 71–73.   
 77. Id.; see also generally Deci & Ryan, supra n. 72. 
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should be passionate about, because she will need that passion to 
fuel the long process of thoroughly exploring a topic.  It also sug-
gests that because choosing an audience is part of the process of 
writing, scholars should choose audiences based on their intrinsic 
desires to join the conversation of a certain rhetorical community. 
Extrinsic incentives in the legal academy can be high, howev-
er. For example the rewards offered for writing scholarship can 
include earning more money, more autonomy, colleagues‘ admira-
tion, and job security; the harm may be second-class citizenship or 
even the loss of a job.  Thus, the legal writing scholar who begins 
work based on an intrinsic interest in a topic or an intrinsic desire 
to contribute to the national conversation can find that intrinsic 
motivation evaporates under the extrinsic pressures of either a 
tenure process or another threat to job security.  
An outgrowth of motivation studies, self-determination 
theory, may provide insight into mitigating this potential motiva-
tion loss.  In contrast to goal-based theories, self-determination 
theory posits that fulfilling human needs can influence motiva-
tion.78  Specifically, fulfilling the needs of competence, related-
ness, and autonomy positively affects motivation.  Of these three 
needs, autonomy can be of particular importance because it can 
lead individuals to internalize motivation.79  
Psychologists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan have found 
that while extrinsic motivation impedes overall motivation, it is 
more complex than a simple finding that it uniformly destroys 
intrinsic motivation.  They posit that extrinsic motivation oper-
ates on a continuum and that given the right circumstances, ex-
trinsic motivation can become perceived as internal.80  Although 
autonomy does not literally transform extrinsic motivation into 
intrinsic motivation, changing an individual‘s perception of where 
motivation originates may allow extrinsic motivation to mimic or 
  
 78. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The ―What‖ and ―Why‖ of Goal Pursuits: Hu-
man Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11:4 Psychol. Inquiry 227, 227 (2000) 
(available at http://www.updatenet.ch/images/7/75/Selbstbestimmung_Deci_Ryan_2000 
.pdf).  ―Needs‖ are defined as ―innate psychological nutriments that are essential for ongo-
ing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being.‖  Id. at 229. Self-determination theory 
shares much with personality theories that emphasize innate needs such as the work of 
Abraham Maslow or R.W. White. Id. at 231.  In contrast, goal-based theories, such as those 
of B.F. Skinner, id., or Locke and Latham emphasize goal selection and pursuit rather 
than needs that drive behavior.  Gagne & Deci, supra n. 72, at 341.  
 79. Deci & Ryan, supra n. 72, at 237. 
 80. Gagne & Deci, supra n. 72, at 331, 334. 
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increase intrinsic motivation.81  In short, preserving autonomy 
may thus mitigate the erosion of motivation created by external 
rewards, and may help fuel motivation.82 
Self-determination theory has been extensively explored in 
legal scholarship by Larry Krieger and other scholars who explore 
―humanizing legal education.‖83  These scholars contend that both 
students‘ learning and professors‘ teaching benefit from support 
for autonomy and intrinsic motivation.84  Legal writing scholars 
have applied self-determination theory to the topic of teaching 
legal writing and have explored ways of increasing the opportuni-
ties for intrinsic motivation to improve the legal writing class-
room.85 
In the context of motivating legal writing professors to write 
scholarship, this needs-based analysis implies that when authors 
feel competent to write, connected to the rhetorical community 
that will receive their communication, and most importantly, in 
charge of their writing decisions, they are more likely to succeed.  
Extrinsic rewards will not extinguish intrinsic motivation as rea-
dily when authors experience ―autonomy support‖ for their writ-
ing decisions.  
This research thus suggests that those in the best position to 
write and support writing are professors outside the reach of the 
  
 81. Id.  
 82. Deci & Ryan, supra n. 78, at 237–239.  
 83. See e.g. Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial about the Dark Side of Law 
School and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Breaking the Silence, 52 J. Leg. Educ. 112 
(2002); Lawrence S. Krieger, Psychological Insights: Why Our Students and Graduates 
Suffer and What We Might Do About It, 1 J. ALWD 259 (2002); Lawrence S. Krieger, Un-
derstanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test 
of Self-Determination Theory, 33 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 883 (2000); Kennon M. 
Sheldon & Bruce J. Winick, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering 
Skills: Meeting the Challenge of the New ABA Standards, 17 St. Thomas L. Rev. 249 
(2005).  
 84. Barbara Glesner Fines, Competition and the Curve, 65 UMKC L. Rev. 879, 911 
(arguing that law school teachers should model intrinsic motivation for students).  
 85. See e.g. M.H. Sam Jacobson, Learning Styles and Lawyering, Using Learning 
Theory to Organize Thinking and Writing, 2 J. ALWD 27 (2004); Sheila Rodriguez, Using 
Feedback Theory to Help Novice Writers Develop Expertise, 86 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 207 
(2009); Robin Wellford Slocum, The Law School Student-Faculty Conference: Toward a 
Transformative Learning Experience, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 255 (2004); Nancy J. Soonpaa, 
Stress in Law Students: A Comparative Study of First-Year, Second-Year, and Third-Year 
Law Students, 36 U. Conn L. Rev. 353 (2004); Emily Zimmerman, An Interdisciplinary 
Framework for Understanding and Cultivating Law Student Enthusiasm, 58 DePaul L. 
Rev. 851 (2009).  
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rewards and threats of the tenure process; those already tenured 
professors whose motivation was not damaged by the tenure 
process or those for whom tenure is not an option.  It also sug-
gests that those in the tenure process surrounded by extrinsic 
rewards and threats may want to focus instead on the parts of the 
process where they exercise autonomy.  Likewise, these scholars 
can be supported by increasing their feelings of autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness.  For example, efforts to persuade tradi-
tional faculty to give pre-tenure scholars the freedom to write in 
any area they choose should be helpful.  The legal writing com-
munity should remain open about how legal writing professors 
choose topics, whether inside or outside the legal writing field.  
Further, we should continue workshops and mentoring systems to 
encourage scholars to feel competent and connected.  We must 
encourage legal writing professors, whatever their situation, to 
write.  
III.  THE FUTURE OF LEGAL WRITING SCHOLARSHIP 
So far, this Article has surveyed our past and taken stock of 
our present. It is now time to look down the road, toward the ho-
rizon.  If, as this Article has suggested, the future of our discipline 
is inextricably linked to our scholarship, then we should think 
carefully about what we will write in this next generation and 
what purposes that scholarship should serve.  
A.   Why Write?  
Scholarship is expensive, after all, requiring significant insti-
tutional and personal resources.86  So we should remind ourselves 
of the purposes to be achieved by that investment.87  Perhaps the 
most important purpose of scholarship is the obligation to ad-
vance human knowledge.  Scholars owe that obligation to identi-
  
 86. The costs of scholarship may range from economic to emotional: 
There are large economic costs—support for the ever-growing host of law reviews, 
research grants, research collections of law libraries, and compensation for student 
research assistants.  There are time and opportunity costs—the hours that faculty 
spend on scholarly research and writing leave less time available for teaching, coun-
seling students, and engaging in university and community service.  Finally there 
are substantial psychic costs to professors who worry about the quality and quantity 
of their writing. 
Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. Leg. Educ. 261, 265 (1990). 
 87. Pollman & Edwards, supra n. 2, at 15.  
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fiable legal constituencies like judges and lawyers, who will put 
the knowledge to good use in the world of practice.  Law teachers 
have both the opportunity to engage legal questions from a rela-
tively objective perspective and the time and resources to study 
professional skills and responsibilities more deeply than can those 
outside the academy.  Scholarship can and should help judges and 
practitioners think more clearly about thorny legal problems and 
their own professional responsibilities.88  
But the obligation to advance knowledge extends more broad-
ly than these predominantly instrumental uses imply, for human-
ity itself advances in often unpredictable ways when human un-
derstanding grows.  Members of the academy are optimally si-
tuated to discover new information, identify unrealized effects, 
and make new connections—to ―understand as fully and as fun-
damentally as possible,‖89 even if purely for the sake of doing so.  
Scholarship does not require an instrumental justification; scho-
lars teach and learn purely for the sake of understanding our 
world and sharing that understanding with others.  If legal writ-
ing professors are to take our place as full members of the acade-
my, we too must undertake a responsibility to advance human 
understanding, taking the intellectual inquiry wherever it leads 
us.  
Perhaps we might think that the responsibility to advance 
knowledge need not apply to legal writing teachers because other 
professors who are not as busy can fulfill this responsibility.  As 
tempting as this idea may be, though, it is not a satisfactory an-
swer.  First, many law professors who do not teach legal writing 
are extraordinarily busy, just as busy in fact as most legal writing 
professors.  Are they exempt as well? Does the responsibility to 
advance human knowledge fall only on those with leisure time?  
That would mean that some of the very best minds would be tak-
en out of the game, and human knowledge would be the poorer for 
  
 88. See e.g. Dennis Archer, The Importance of Law Reviews to the Judiciary and the 
Bar, 1991 Det. C.L. Rev. 229, 236–237; Ronald Benton Brown, A Cure for Scholarship 
Schizophrenia: A Manifesto for Sane Productivity and Productive Sanity, 13 Nova L. Rev. 
39, 46 (1988); Michael J. Graetz & Charles H. Whitebread II, Monrad Paulsen and the 
Idea of a University Law School, 67 V. L. Rev. 445, 454 (1981) (―A university law school is 
among the few institutions for anticipating future social needs and for relating the role of 
law to furthering those needs.  It must produce lawyers for tomorrow.‖  (Cited in Donald J. 
Polden, Scholarship in Legal Education, 24 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 2 n. 8 (1993)). 
 89. Archer, supra n. 88, at 279.  
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it.  Second, and perhaps more important, scholarly contributions 
are not generic.  Legal writing professors have a unique perspec-
tive, a unique set of skills, and a unique knowledge base.  Realis-
tically, some contributions to knowledge will be made only if they 
are made by a legal writing professor. To exempt legal writing 
professors from any responsibility for scholarship would be to 
choose to forego the contributions no other group is likely to 
make. 
Another important purpose of scholarship is the enhance-
ment of teaching.90  Obviously, the more a professor knows, the 
more the professor can share with students,91 but that simple cor-
relation does not fully describe the relationship between teaching 
and scholarship.  Writing also enhances teaching when it contri-
butes to students‘ moral education,92 when it provides examples of 
excellence,93 and when it enhances the professor‘s own analytical 
abilities, and is then put to use in teaching.94  For legal writing 
professors, though, perhaps the most important link to teaching is 
the discipline of doing what we expect our students to do.  We can 
forget how excruciatingly difficult writing can be; how frustrating 
it can be to try to master a new subject and present new material 
in a logical way; and how intimidating it can be to expose oneself 
in print.  We can forget how confusing and disorienting it is to 
write in a new language or voice or in a new genre, or to a new 
audience.  If we ask our students to do these things, can we ask 
less of ourselves?  Tennis coaches play tennis.  Cooking teachers 
cook.  And for the same reasons, writing teachers should write. 
If legal writing professors should write because we teach 
writing, what exactly is it that we should write?  One might re-
spond that the teaching rationale for writing leads to the conclu-
  
 90. See Brown, supra n. 88, at 49–51; Clark Byse, Legal Scholarship, Legal Realism 
and the Law Teacher’s Intellectual Schizophrenia, 13 Nova L. Rev. 9, 29–30 (1988). 
 91. James Boyd White, Why I Write, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1021, 1032 (1996). 
 92. Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 Yale 
L.J. 955, 968 (1981) (A scholar‘s pursuit of the truth can ―preserve in his students an atti-
tude of friendship, or goodwill, towards those who seek the truth and indeed toward the 
truth itself.‖). 
 93. David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 993, 1003 
(1991) (―So why write? Fundamentally, the answer is a matter of vocation and ethics. The 
aspiration to excellence breeds excellence in students and in legal audiences.‖). 
 94. Id. at 999 (―Although scholarship as an intellectual pursuit is commendable for its 
own worth, that is not its raison d‘etre in the professional law school. If professors do not 
engage in scholarship, they cannot fully foster critical analytical skills in their students, 
because their own skills will atrophy.‖). 
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sion that we should write briefs and office memos, not scholar-
ship.  If part of the value of writing is our own practice of what we 
teach, then perhaps we should write primarily examples of the 
precise genres we teach.  That argument has a certain appeal, but 
ultimately, it misses the primary value our writing can have for 
our teaching.  Most of us can write an office memo or a brief quite 
easily.  Most of us have to work much harder and experience 
much more confusion and insecurity in order to write a law re-
view article.  The greatest teaching value in our writing is ex-
periencing again the kinds of difficulties our students experience.  
For us, it is most likely that we will experience those difficulties if 
we write in a genre other than the genre we teach.  
Scholarship carries another obligation—the obligation to 
speak truth to power.95  Face to face with power, the only options 
are to retreat into an ivory tower; to speak on behalf of and there-
fore to serve the structure of power; or to confront that power, 
that is, to speak the language of prophetic confrontation.96  A 
scholar might be called to confront governmental power or the 
practices of the profession, but a scholar is called also to speak 
truth to the powerful structures of legal education.  The purposes 
of scholarship are well served when legal education is critiqued, 
and no one is better situated to critique and improve legal educa-
tion than those on the inside, those who know it best.97 
  
 95. As James Boyd White writes, the activity of expression not only ―is the heart of 
intellectual and ethical life,‖ but also has a public and political dimension,  
for there is always the question whether we shall find ways to insist upon our own 
freedom and responsibility in a world of constraint, to respect the humanity and re-
ality of other people and their experience, and to contribute to the formation of a cul-
ture and a policy that will enhance human dignity—or whether we shall instead lead 
lives imprisoned in dead modes of thought and expression that deny the value of 
ourselves and other people, and the activities of life we share.   
James Boyd White, Living Speech: Resisting the Empire of Force, at preface (Princeton U. 
Press 2006). 
 96. David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental 
Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 Pitt. L. Rev. 127, 172 (1988) (relying on 
the work of Arthur Schlesinger and Hans Morgenthau). 
 97. Much legal writing scholarship has critiqued legal education on issues ranging 
from status to curriculum design. On status issues, see e.g., Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy 
Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 117 
(1997); Jo Anne Durako, Dismantling Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of Legal Writ-
ing Faculty in Law Schools: Separate and Unequal, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 253 (2004); Jo Anne 
Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. Leg. 
Educ. 562 (2000); Pamela Edwards, Teaching Legal Writing as Women’s Work: Life on the 
Fringes of the Academy, 4 Cardozo Women's L.J. 75 (1997); Emily Grant, Toward a Deeper 
Understanding of Legal Research and Writing as a Developing Profession, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 
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Scholarship brings individual rewards as well.  Writing can 
be personally and professionally transformative.98  Scholars 
should write for the sheer pleasure of doing a difficult task well99 
and for the excitement of the new territory to be explored.  This 
personal and professional pleasure and transformation have val-
ue beyond the scholar‘s own enjoyment.  The best teachers are 
curious, constantly learning and adapting, and intellectually en-
gaged.  Students, institutions, judges, and lawyers are well served 
by such energized teacher/scholars, whose own transformation 
can spark transformation in others as well.  This transformative 
pleasure may be especially important for legal writing professors 
whose teaching load is both heavy and unchanging.  Many legal 
writing professors teach nothing but legal writing: two sections of 
memo writing in the fall of students‘ first year and two sections of 
persuasive writing in the spring.  Law professors who do not 
teach legal writing usually teach courses on three or four different 
  
371 (2003); Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track Directors 
and Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. Leg. Educ. 530 (1995); Jan 
M. Levine & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages: Breaking the Last Taboo, 7 
Wm. & Mary J. Women L. 551 (2001); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Educa-
tion: A Statistical Update, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 419 (2004); Robbins, supra n. 65; Kathryn M. 
Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist Critique of the Status Hierarchy of Law 
Professors, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 467 (2004); Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender 
and Legal Writing: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16 Berkeley Women's L.J. 3 (2001). 
  On curriculum, see e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, MacCrate (In)action: The Case for 
Enhancing the Upper-Level Writing Requirement in Law Schools, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 115, 
(2007); Erasing Lines, supra n. 42; Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing-
Across-the-Law-School Curriculum: Theoretical Justifications, Curricular Implications, 2 
J. ALWD 73 (2004); Carol M. Parker, A Liberal Education in Law: Engaging the Legal 
Imagination Through Research and Writing Beyond the Curriculum, 1 J. ALWD 130 
(2002); Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools 
Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 561 (1997). 
 98. James Boyd White described this transformation when he wrote,  
The task the course set me, then, was the direct analogue of Thoreau‘s task: to write 
my way out of Concord, out of false and inauthentic forms of speech and thought, to 
a kind of Walden, to a voice and language of my own. Writing to me thus became a 
way of creating a voice with which to speak and be, with which to represent and 
transform my own experience.  
White, supra n. 91, at 1030. 
 99. Arthur Leff, claiming the last word at the Yale symposium, wrote,  
And of course, for all that, legal scholarship is also something that produces plea-
sure. I do not want to end this symposium on the note of pure Yellow-Book aesthetic-
ism, but I defy any of the symposiats (and at least many of the readers) to deny that 
they‘re also in the game . . . for those occasional moments when they say, in some 
concise and illuminating way, something that appears to be true. . . . [T]o have 
crafted, on occasion, something true and truly put—whatever the devil else legal 
scholarship is, is from, or is for, it‘s the joy of that too. 
Arthur A. Leff, Afterword, 90 Yale L.J. 1296, 1296 (1981). 
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topics each year.  It would not be surprising to find that it is the 
legal writing professor who is most in need of the excitement of 
learning new material and exploring new intellectual territory. 
These purposes are compelling in and of themselves, and the 
desire to fulfill them is a powerful internal justification for the 
practice of scholarship.  Ideally, these are the reasons we will 
write.  But the legal writing community has an additional exter-
nal reason to write.  If we are ever to achieve full membership in 
the academy, we will need to take our places as scholars as well 
as teachers, engaging fully in important ongoing conversations 
and initiating some new conversations as well.  If we expect to be 
subject to reduced professional expectations, we will always be 
subject to reduced status.  Inferior status results in unfairness for 
individual legal writing professors personally, and even more im-
portantly, it often reduces our effectiveness with our students.  
Yes, scholarship is hard.  It takes significant personal and in-
stitutional resources.  But even for legal writing professors, may-
be especially for legal writing professors, these purposes for scho-
larship justify the institutional and personal costs good scholar-
ship requires.  The spectrum of scholarship we produce should 
serve these articulated values.  If it does, we will be fulfilling our 
responsibilities to our students, to the practice, to other scholars, 
to humankind, and to ourselves as well.  
B.   Why Rhetoric? 
Making the rhetorical turn to (1) study the ―effects of texts‖100 
and to (2) practice and (3) teach the construction of ―effective 
texts‖ places our professional work in new lights and relation-
ships.  Because rhetoric explores a meaning-making process in 
which the law is ―constituted‖ as human beings located within 
particular historical and cultural communities write, read, argue 
about, and decide legal issues, it provides an attractive picture of 
what we do in our scholarship, teaching, and professional interac-
tions.101  
  
 100. Mailloux, supra n. 3, at 40. 
 101. For discussion of ―law as rhetoric‖ generally, see White, supra n. 7. For discussion 
of teaching ―law as rhetoric,‖ see Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching ―Law as Rhetor-
ic‖: A Place to Stand, 16 Leg. Writing 3 (2010). 
  The ―rhetorical turn‖ in legal scholarship has been much discussed. See e.g. Stan-
ley Fish, Rhetoric, in Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of 
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Rhetoric makes it possible for us to view our teaching and 
scholarship as creative, constructive, and productive while still 
grounded in law, language, and reason.102  Adopting rhetoric as 
the focus for our study and practice seems like a straight and nar-
row path to some: ―Lawyers are rhetors.  They make arguments to 
convince other people.  They deal in persuasion.‖103  Proposing 
―that the law is a branch of rhetoric,‖ James Boyd White wrote, 
―Who, you may ask, could ever have thought it was anything 
else?‖104  In this view, rhetoric is not ―merely‖ a tool or a set of 
techniques, nor even the art or craft of persuasion, but instead, it 
is an interactive process of persuasion and argumentation that is 
used to resolve uncertain questions in this setting and for the 
time being. 
For many, however, rhetoric remains suspect, on the grounds 
that rhetoric is not reality, but trickery, or that it is ―cookery‖ and 
not science.105  For them, we offer these arguments. 
First, although rhetoric and law have a long relationship and 
a rich history,106 their relationship is often denied107 and remains 
a relatively unexplored field of study.108  Second, rhetoric provides 
  
Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 471, 485–494 (1989) (discussing disciplines in which 
rhetoric has been ―on the upswing‖); Francis J. Mootz, III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal 
Practice and Theory, 6 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 491, 572 (1998) (―Legal practice is rhetoric all 
the way down, with rhetorical engagements layered upon rhetorical engagements in a 
dynamic and challenging confluence that cannot be constrained by pretenses of analytical 
certainty.‖); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 Vt. L. 
Rev.  681, 685–686 (1994) (―In the legal culture today one can discern the rhetoric of multi-
vocality, empathy, and emotion playing out against a living backdrop of drama, myth, and 
metaphor.‖); Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 Va. L. Rev. 
1545, 1549 n. 14 (1990) (discussing a range of ideas related to the ―epistemological conse-
quences of rhetoric‖).  
 102. See Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning 
279 (Oxford U. Press 2005) (―Rational legal argument . . . is not demonstrative argument . . 
. . It is rationally persuasive, rather than rationally demonstrative.‖). 
 103. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Rela-
tionship, 18 Yale J.L. & Humanities 155, 177 (2006). 
 104. White, supra n. 7, at 684. 
 105. See Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind 6–12 (U. Chi. 
Press 2001) (discussing the ―ideology‖ of rationalism). 
 106. White, supra n. 7, at 684–685.  Gorgias, the most famous of the Sophists, said that 
rhetoric was ―the art of persuading the people about matters of justice and injustice in the 
public places of the state.‖ See id. at 684 (quoting Plato‘s dialogue of the same name). 
  Despite the close historical ties between law and rhetoric, Peter Brooks has writ-
ten that ―the professionalization of law and legal education has over time tended to ob-
scure the rhetorical roots of legal practice.‖ Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does 
the Law Need a Narratology? 18 Yale J.L. & Humanities 1, 2, 28 (2006). 
 107. Wetlaufer, supra n. 101, at 1554–1555. 
 108. See e.g. Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal 
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a middle ground between the views that law is all rules (reason) 
or all power (politics).109  In this way, rhetoric offers the possibili-
ty of ―improving life within one‘s community in temporary and 
incomplete, but nonetheless meaningful, ways‖ as well as more 
positive ways of re-envisioning the concept of agency and the   
status of science.110 
For legal writing teachers, both our teaching and our reading 
have a natural relationship to the study and practice of rhetor-
ic.111  Moreover, because the academy prefers reading over writing 
and the interpretation of text over the composition of text, we can 
only benefit by marrying the two: ―rhetoric [can be used] as a 
  
Analysis 39 (Palgrave Macmillan 1987) (―Despite the glaringly obvious fact that both legal 
theory and legal practice are, and have always been, heavily dependent upon the tools of 
rhetorical and linguistic analysis, no coherent or systematic account of the relationship of 
law to language has ever been achieved.‖); Barbara J. Shapiro, Classical Rhetoric and the 
English Law of Evidence, in Rhetoric & Law in Early Modern Europe 54 (Victoria Kahn & 
Lorna Hutson eds., Yale U. Press 2001) (―Given the long-standing association between law 
and rhetoric, there has been surprisingly little real study of the impact of rhetoric on the 
Anglo-American legal tradition.‖). 
 109. Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 677, 691 (1999).  A related ar-
gument has been made in the field of contemporary rhetorical theory: that rhetoric pro-
vides an alternative between modernism (in the sense of discovering eternal truths) and 
postmodernism (in the sense of uncovering certainties and revealing them as essentially 
changeable). John Louis Lucaites & Celeste Michelle Condit, Epilogue: Contributions from 
Rhetorical Theory, in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader 609–610 (John Louis 
Lucaites et al. eds., Guilford Press 1999).  
 110. Id. at 610–613. 
 111. Professors who teach legal writing have long argued for rhetoric‘s place in legal 
writing pedagogy. See e.g. Fajans & Falk, supra n. 27; Neil Feigenson, Legal Writing Texts 
Today, 41 J. Leg. Educ. 503 (1991); Phelps, supra n. 25; J. Christopher Rideout & Jill 
Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 35 (1994). 
  Several legal writing textbooks explicitly apply classical and contemporary rhetor-
ic to professional legal writing: Kirsten Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writ-
ers: The Theory and Practice of Analysis and Persuasion (West 2009); Michael R. Smith, 
Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive Writing (2d ed., Aspen 
Publishers 2008).  In a series of articles, Michael Frost has extensively applied classical 
rhetorical analysis to legal interpretation and composition. See Michael H. Frost, Introduc-
tion to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage (Ashgate 2005) (collection of articles pub-
lished between 1990 and 2003). 
  Articles advocating more use of rhetorical teaching throughout the law school 
curriculum include Leslie Bender, Hidden Messages in the Required First-Year Law School 
Curriculum, 40 Clev. St. L. Rev. 287 (1992) (arguing that the traditional focus on appellate 
cases and authority underscores the hidden message that specific facts, contexts, and 
people are nearly irrelevant); Elizabeth C. Britt et al., Extending the Boundaries of Rhetor-
ic in Legal Writing Pedagogy, 10 J. Bus. & Tech. Comm. 213, 213 (1996) (proposing a new 
conception of rhetoric‘s role in the law school curriculum); Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, To Say 
What the Law Is: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 861 (1995) 
(suggesting that legal writing is ―not something distinct from what is taught in other law 
classes‖ but instead that both doctrinal and legal writing courses ―can and do teach the 
practice of legal rhetoric‖). 
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guide for composing and as a stance for interpreting.‖112  Finally, 
having been on the ―outside‖113 of the legal academy and having 
been relegated for the most part to teaching the housekeeping 
details of rhetoric (arrangement and style), legal writing profes-
sors can find many uses for rhetoric‘s most creative and     
thoughtful component, invention.114  
Because of the decline of formalism and the advent of a par-
ticularly cynical form of realism, this seems an opportune time for 
us to participate more fully in building better understandings of 
―how things work‖ in the law.  If formalism, the idea that judges 
simply apply the rules like umpires do, is in decline, this decline 
should also be a blow to traditional legal scholarship because such 
scholarship ―focuse[s] on the careful, comprehensive, and precise 
analysis of relatively abstract doctrinal standards found in the 
legal forms of cases, statutes, administrative rulings, and legisla-
tive histories.‖115  
In contrast to the view that legal outcomes are determined 
solely by the rules (formalism) or only by politics and power (the 
current brand of realism), the rhetorical perspective affords a 
richer possibilities.  That is, it envisions lawyers, teachers, and 
law students as being engaged in a process of making meaning by 
the back and forth of conversation and argument.  Rhetoric opens 
the lens for legal writing scholars because it allows us to concen-
trate on the kinds of textual analysis lawyers already engage in, 
but to introduce as well the kinds of broader contextual analyses 
recommended by rhetoricians. 
More than any other teacher in the law school setting, legal 
writing teachers explicitly teach legal rhetoric—the analysis, in-
terpretation, criticism, and composition of legal arguments.  We 
help students learn to read legal texts; we help them learn how to 
use legal authorities; and we help them learn how to articulate 
legal rules and construct legal arguments. 
  
 112. Mailloux, supra n. 3, at 40. 
 113. ―Rhetoric is often about who‘s in and who‘s out, what‘s included and what‘s ex-
cluded, who is placed inside and who outside a cultural community, a political movement, 
a professional organization.‖ Id. at 124. 
 114. Invention in classical rhetoric is not creating something out of nothing, but seeing 
something in a new way. See J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhe-
toric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law 
211, 221–224 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gerwitz eds., Yale U. Press 1996). 
 115. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1743 (1991). 
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When we work with students who are struggling to state the 
rule that a case stands for, or what that rule means, we recognize 
what an intensely creative and intellectually difficult activity le-
gal reading and writing can be.  This is even more the case when 
students grasp the concept that opinions are not rulebooks but 
instead are pots full of rhetorical possibilities,116 that language is 
not so much ambiguous as it is ―resourceful.‖  When we work with 
students struggling to write persuasively, who want to know the 
―one right way‖ to achieve a particular purpose, we realize how 
complex and imaginatively demanding is the work of persuasion. 
Moreover, legal writing raises troubling questions about the 
practice of legal rhetoric in concrete form—the lives of our stu-
dents.  What kinds of rhetoricians are we teaching our students to 
be, and what kinds of rhetorical communities are we asking them 
to join?  This question shows up as the fear that in writing the 
torture memos, John Yoo was conducting himself the way he had 
been taught; as a really good law student, he was doing exactly 
what we taught him to do, manipulating language and mean-
ing.117  Or from a different perspective, it shows up in James Boyd 
White‘s concern that in much of legal writing, no one is at home 
because of the kind of voicelessness we encourage students and 
lawyers to adopt.118  As we teach students to master the forms of 
speech and writing that they need to know in the culture into 
which they are moving, are we guiding them toward becoming 
alienated from their own minds and experiences and teaching 
them to produce an imitation of expression?119 
For law professors, rhetoric offers a way to bring together the 
objects of their study (the variety of legal ―texts‖ that are the ―ob-
jects of interpretive attention‖120) with the subject matter of their 
teaching and the composition of their scholarship.  For example, 
the professor who use a rhetorical approach to analyze a judicial 
opinion will be better able to teach students how to interpret and 
  
 116. Wetlaufer, supra n. 101, at 1560. 
 117. See Peter Brooks, What to Do About Yoo? 55 Chron. Higher Educ. B4 (May 8, 
2009). 
 118. See e.g. James Boyd White, Legal Writing, in From Expectation to Experience: 
Essays on Law & Legal Education 27 (U. Mich. Press 2000) (Legal writing ―will often seem 
to be a training in forms of expression that are rigid, mechanical, or dead; to allow no room 
for the work of the individual mind or the expression of the individual imagination.‖).   
 119. Id. 
 120. Mailloux, supra n. 3, at 40. 
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construct legal arguments because she has taken apart the struc-
ture of an argument and evaluated the effectiveness of an au-
thor‘s rhetorical choices.  Similarly, the law professor may direct-
ly apply rhetorical theory to the classroom conversation, treating 
the semester‘s work as a series of rhetorical transactions between 
student and teacher, reader and writer, inherited texts and cur-
rent arguments, individuals and social contexts.121  
Beyond suggestions for the individual scholar, focusing on 
rhetorical theory and analysis can help build an intentional 
framework for meeting institutional goals.  Rhetoric lends itself to 
the further evolution and building of our discipline.  For example, 
rhetorical study is a device for transforming ―practical wisdom 
into accredited techniques.‖122 Such rhetorical scholarship would 
describe and evaluate interpretive practices, that is, ways to read, 
research, and teach about legal documents; it would help us de-
rive theories for categorizing and studying texts; and it would al-
low us to describe, compare, and evaluate traditions.123 
C.   What Would It Mean to Focus on Rhetoric?  
This section provides initial suggestions for using the modes 
and methods of rhetoric in our teaching, scholarship, and profes-
sional outreach.  For this purpose, we divide ―rhetoric‖ into (1) the 
study of legal texts, (2) the process of composing legal documents, 
and (3) the use of rhetorical perspectives to spur invention and 
imagination.124  
1.   Rhetoric as the Study of Legal Texts.  
Rhetoric provides many alternative methods for interpreta-
tion, analysis, and criticism; in both our teaching and our scholar-
ship, we can apply these to better understand all forms of legal 
argument.  Among its other benefits, rhetoric suggests that to 
effectively read a legal document, we must read beyond the text 
  
 121. See e.g. Linda L. Berger, A Reflective, Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher 
as Reader and Writer, 6 Leg. Writing 57 (2000). 
 122. Mailloux, supra n. 3, at 5. 
 123. See also Stratman, supra n. 6, at 210. These might include the kinds of arguments 
most often used by members of the discipline, characteristic approaches and questions of 
the discipline, stock stories and myths, and canonical examples.  For examples, see Smith, 
supra n. 40. 
 124. This categorization comes from Berger, supra n. 101. 
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itself, recognizing that we cannot find meaning in the language 
alone without reference to the context provided by history, cul-
ture, language uses, author, and audience.  
Both classical and contemporary rhetoric offer methods for 
teaching students to engage in close or critical reading and for 
engaging in such reading ourselves.  These methods range from 
reading to identify appeals based on classical rhetoric‘s modes of 
persuasion (logos, ethos, and pathos) or topics125 to applying 
James Boyd White‘s questions for rhetorical analysis (context, art 
of the text, rhetorical community).126  Similarly, understanding 
narrative structure127 and argument framing (categories and me-
taphors)128 aids students in their interpretations and assessments 
of the opinions they read as well as the briefs they write and re-
spond to.  
Such rhetorical approaches not only enrich our teaching—and 
they can be applied to ―teaching‖ practicing lawyers as well—but 
also can result in valuable scholarship.  For example, legal writ-
ing scholars have used these approaches to evaluate the effective-
ness of briefs, opinions, and oral arguments129 and to study par-
  
 125. See Corbett & Connors, supra n. 3, at 1. 
 126. White, supra n. 7, at 701–702. 
 127. For helpful descriptions of narrative theory and structure, see Anthony G. Ams-
terdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law 110–142 (Harv. U. Press 2002) and articles 
cited in Stanchi, supra n. 46, at 77–79. For articles describing how narrative theory may 
be used to interpret legal arguments, see for example, Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a 
Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 Tenn. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2010). 
 128. For descriptions of category and metaphor theory, see Amsterdam & Bruner, supra 
n. 127, at 19–53, and articles cited in Stanchi, supra n. 46, at 79–81, 83–84. For articles 
applying category and metaphor theory to interpretation of legal arguments, see Linda L. 
Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetori-
cal Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. 
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 259 (2009); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate 
Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 
58 Mercer L. Rev. 949 (2007) (analyzing the use of metaphor and metonymy in Supreme 
Court opinions); Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the 
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004) 
(applying metaphor theory to analyze the briefs filed in the Supreme Court in a case rais-
ing First Amendment corporate speech issues); Laura E. Little, Characterization and 
Legal Discourse, 46 J. Leg. Educ. 372 (1996) (suggesting ways to use framing to improve 
legal arguments). 
 129. See e.g. Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments 
to a Jury, 37 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 55 (1992) (applying a range of rhetorical analyses to 
closing arguments);  Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United 
States v. Dickerson, Role [Im]morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. Haw. L. 
Rev. 1 (2000) (examining the ethics of ―role-differentiated rhetoric): Michael Frost, Brief 
Rhetoric—A Note on Classical and Modern Theories of Forensic Discourse, 38 U. Kan. L. 
Rev. 411 (1990) (applying classical rhetorical analysis to briefs filed with the United States 
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ticular author practices and audience responses.130  Such scholar-
ship, in turn, may apply directly to our teaching.131  
2.  Rhetoric as the Process of Composing Legal Texts.  
Perhaps the most obvious application of rhetorical theory and 
analysis for legal writing teachers is its usefulness in teaching the 
process of composition.  Contemporary rhetoric, specifically the 
New Rhetoric, is the source of much of our understanding about 
how to teach writing as a process for making meaning through 
the interaction of reader and writer, text and context.132  As for 
specific applications, classical rhetoric provides frameworks for 
invention as well as guides that help law students and lawyers 
check their logical arguments for validity and effectiveness; clas-
sical rhetoric also is the foundation for all later advice about ar-
rangement (organization) and style.133  Other rhetorical methods 
well suited for the legal writing classroom include those asso-
ciated with Joseph Williams, in which students are asked to read 
samples, extract vocabulary to describe the good and bad aspects 
  
Supreme Court). 
 130. See e.g. Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appel-
late Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4. J. App. Prac. & Process 417 (2002); Kenneth D. 
Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7 J. ALWD 
___ (forthcoming 2010); Bryan A. Garner, Judges on Briefing: A National Survey, 8 Scribes 
J. Leg. Writing 1 (2002); Susan Hanley Kosse & David ButleRitchie, How Judges, Practi-
tioners, and Legal Writing Teachers Assess the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates: A 
Comparative Study, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 80 (2003); Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: 
What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 Leg. Writing 257 
(2002); James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal Discourse in Real 
Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal Court Briefs, 17 Discourse 
Processes 1 (1994). 
 131. See e.g. Kate O‘Neill, Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach When We Teach 
Posner, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 507 (2009). 
 132. Berger, supra n. 4, at 155–156; Jo Ann Durako et al., From Product to Process: 
Evolution of a Legal Writing Program, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 719 (1997); Ellie Margolis & 
Susan L. DeJarnatt, Moving beyond Product to Process: Building a Better LRW Program, 
46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 93 (2003); Laurel Currie Oates, Beyond Communication: Writing as 
a Means of Learning, 6 Leg. Writing 1 (2000); Nancy Soonpaa, Using Composition Theory 
and Scholarship to Teach Legal Writing More Effectively, 3 Leg. Writing 81 (1997). 
 133. See e.g. Corbett & Connors, supra n. 3, at 33–71 (logic), 84–130 (topics for inven-
tion), 256–292 (arrangement), 376–411 (style); Frost, supra n. 129, at 411–423 (arrange-
ment), 423–431 (style); Robbins-Tiscione, supra n. 111, at chs. 5–7 (invention), ch. 8 (ar-
rangement), ch. 9 (style); Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhe-
toric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 483 (2003); Smith, supra n. 111, at pt. II 
(logos strategies), pt. III (pathos strategies), pt. IV (ethos strategies), pt. V (rhetorical 
style). 
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of the models, and then apply the insights to diagnose and revise 
their own work.134 
As for scholarship centering on the rhetorical processes of 
composition, legal writing scholars have used rhetorical theory to 
describe and evaluate the development of the field.135  Similarly, 
composition and rhetoric theory has been the basis for articles 
written about law school applications of the use of reading jour-
nals;136 writers‘ memos;137 peer review;138 feedback, drafting, and 
revision;139 portfolios;140 writing conferences;141 and other forms of 
self-evaluation and reflection.142  More recently, legal writing 
scholars are turning to rhetorical theories to provide advice to 
students and lawyers about how to construct arguments.143 
  
 134. See Joseph M. Williams, Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace (9th ed., Longman 
2007); Hillary Burgess, Little Red Schoolhouse Goes to Law School: How Joe Williams’ 
Teaching Style Can Inform Us About Teaching Law Students, 17 Persps. 180 (Spring 
2009). 
 135. See Berger, supra n. 4; Joel R. Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 
Mercer L. Rev. 1091 (1997); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Enter-
ing the Discourse of Law, 40 Duq. L. Rev. 489 (2002); Anne Ruggles Gere, Narratives of 
Composition Studies, 3 Leg. Writing 51 (1997); Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, ―To Say What the 
Law Is‖: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 861 (1995); Phelps, 
supra n. 25; Pollman, supra n. 54; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra n. 111; Lorne Sossin, Dis-
course Politics: Legal Research and Writing's Search for a Pedagogy of Its Own, 29 New 
Eng. L. Rev. 883 (1995); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing 
Pedagogy Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 7 
(1998).  
 136. Berger, supra n. 4, at 172–174; Fajans & Falk, supra n. 27, at 202–203. 
 137. Berger, supra n. 4, at 178 n. 139; Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, 
Teaching Students How to ―Think Like Lawyers‖: Integrating Socratic Method with the 
Writing Process, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 885, 894–895 (1991). 
 138. Berger, supra n. 4, at 179–183; Bari R. Burke, Legal Writing (Groups) at the Uni-
versity of Montana: Professional Voice Lessons in a Communal Context, 52 Mont. L. Rev. 
373, 397 (1991); Kirsten K. Davis, Designing and Using Peer Review in a First-Year Legal 
Research and Writing Course, 9 Leg. Writing 1 (2003); DeJarnatt, supra n. 135. 
 139. See e.g. Leg. Writing Inst. Monograph Series, supra n. 45. 
 140. See e.g. Steven J. Johansen, ―What Were You Thinking?‖: Using Annotated Port-
folios to Improve Student Assessment, 4 Leg. Writing 123 (1998). 
 141. See e.g. Robin Wellford, The Law School Student-Faculty Conference: Towards a 
Transformative Learning Experience, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 255 (2004). 
 142. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald Schon, the Reflective Practitioner, and the 
Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6 Clin. L. Rev. 401 (2000). 
 143. For textbooks, see Robbins-Tiscione, supra n. 111; Smith, supra n. 111; see also 
Frost, supra n. 111. For a sampling of articles, see Stanchi, supra n. 46, at 77–87; Sympo-
sium, Applied Storytelling, 14 Leg. Writing 3 (2008); Metaphor & Narrative, 7 J. ALWD 
___ (forthcoming 2010).  See also Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent 
in Law, 50 Emory L.J. 1197 (2001); Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a 
Rhetor, 43 J. Leg. Educ. 108 (1993) (applying classical rhetoric and the approach of Lloyd 
F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 Phil. & Rhetoric 1 (1968) to legal argument); Ellie 
Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 
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3.  Rhetoric as Perspective or Lens.  
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, legal writing pro-
fessors may use rhetoric as a perspective or lens to guide the 
process of imagination and invention.  Rhetoric‘s ability to un-
earth embedded pathways and to unsettle preconceptions can be 
tapped in a number of ways.  Thus, rhetoric can help writers see 
through new eyes,144 make the familiar strange, look from the 
outside in and the inside out, and link abstractions to concrete 
images and stories.145  
As already noted, classical rhetoric‘s general and special top-
ics can serve as a heuristic for generating lines of argument.146  
Other special topics that lend themselves to re-seeing legal argu-
ments may include those identified with literary criticism,147 such 
as contrasting appearances with reality; finding a previously 
overlooked, but ―ubiquitous‖ argument; discovering a paradigmat-
ic structure in a literary text that provides form and framework; 
and arguing that previous interpreters have repeatedly over-
looked some important characteristic.  Contemporary rhetorical 
approaches that can be used to encourage invention include such 
  
34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 197 (2000); Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 
44 J. Leg. Educ. 566 (1994) (applying Toulmin‘s and Perelman‘s approaches to legal argu-
ment); Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far, 
Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in 
Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 Willamette L. Rev. 255 (2009); Michael R. 
Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 919 (2007); 
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 411.  
 144. For example, to use metaphor to resolve problems, Donald Schön suggested that 
the problem solver must attend to new features and relationships of the situation, and 
then rename the pieces, regroup the parts, reorder the frameworks, and try to ―see‖ one 
situation ―as‖ other situations. Donald A. Schön, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on 
Problem-Setting in Social Policy, in Metaphor and Thought 150–161 (Andrew Ortony ed., 
2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 1993); see also John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An 
Introduction to Social Psychology 196 (Henry Holt & Co. 1922) (―T]he elaborate systems of 
science are born not of reason but of impulses at first sight and flickering; impulses to 
handle, move about, to hunt, to uncover, to mix things separated and divide things com-
bined, to talk and to listen.‖). 
 145. The concept of making the familiar strange comes from Amsterdam & Bruner, 
supra n. 127, at 1 and throughout the book; the concept of looking from the outside in and 
the inside out comes from bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, at preface 
(S. End Press 1984). 
 146. See Corbett & Connors, supra n. 3, at 84–130. 
 147. See Coulson, supra n. 12, at 173–174 (citing Jeanne Fahnestock & Marie Secor, 
The Rhetoric of Literary Criticism, in Textual Dynamics of the Professions 84 (Charles 
Bazerman & James Paradis eds., U. Wis. Press 1991)). 
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concepts as Kenneth Burke‘s pentad for examining narrative ac-
tion148 (narrative structure) or his suggestions for metaphor mod-
eling (try to consider the many different ways in which a concept 
could be described);149 bell hooks‘s ―from the margins‖ perspec-
tive;150 Chaim Perelman‘s ―starting points‖;151 and Stephen Toul-
min‘s layout of practical argument and ―good reasons‖ approach to 
ethics.152  
As always, rhetoric as a perspective becomes both topic and 
tool.  That is, we can write about the use of invention methods 
themselves, and we can write about what we discover when we 
use these methods.  In other words, rhetoric again brings us new 
ways of looking at things that can bring about change in our aca-
demic and professional lives and communities. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rhetoric tells us that our reading and writing can be used to 
construct meaning, and it allows us to engage in research and 
scholarship that informs and enriches our understanding of how 
the law works as well as our teaching of current and future law-
yers.  Because of the topics we teach, ―[t]he meaning-making view 
of writing [should] appeal to those [of us] who view reading and 
writing as ways to live, not just as ways to make a living.‖153  
For legal writing professors, as well as for our students, ―writ-
ing creates situations in which [we] learn to think.‖154 
  
 148. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives xvii–xxiv (World 
Publg. Co. 1962) (describing dramatism, which treats language and thought as modes of 
action); Sonja K. Foss et al., Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric 191–204 (3d ed., Wa-
veland Press 2002). 
 149. ―If we are in doubt as to what an object is . . . we deliberately try to consider it in 
as many different terms as its nature permits: lifting, smelling, tasting, tapping, holding 
in different lights, subjecting to different pressures, dividing, matching, contrasting, etc.‖ 
Burke, supra n. 148, at 504 (discussing metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony in 
connection ―with their role in the discovery and description of ‗the truth‘‖). 
   150.   hooks, supra n. 145. 
 151. Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Ar-
gumentation (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., U. Notre Dame 1969). 
 152. See Foss et al., supra n. 148, at 117–153; see also Saunders, supra n. 143, at 568–
572. 
 153. Berger, supra n. 4, at 159–160 n. 35. 
 154. Elaine P. Maimon et al., Thinking, Reading, and Writing 3 (Longman 1989). 
